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I.

INTRODUCTION
The important natural and cultural values of virtually every

unit of the National Park System are threatened by proposed
activities on public and private lands beyond park boundaries.
E.q., National Park Service, Dept, of the Interior, State of the
Parks 1980:

A Report to Congress (May, 1980)

Parks); Cahn,

Islands in a Storm:

(State of the

Our National Parks (Five-part

series in the Christian Science Monitor beginning June 14, 1982,
reprinted in Oversight on the Current State of the National Park
System Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and National Parks
of the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs,
2nd Sess. 856-74 (1982).

These "threats" include,

power plants, mining operations,

97th Cong.,
inter alia,

timbering, road and utility

corridor development, and subdivision construction.

Id.

The Park Service has ample authority to protect the parks
from incompatible development on federal lands under its organic
act, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1 e t . seq., and the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq., and from develop
ment on non-federal lands under the organic act when read
together with the Constitution's Commerce Clause,
U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and Property
Clause. U.S. Const, art IV, § 3, cl. 2 and the cases interpreting
these constitutional provisions.
The crux of the problem is to develop an effective
(politically realistic and economically sound) mechanism to
ensure that the Park Service can protect the parks from external
1

development which poses a significant threat to park values and
would impair the visitor experience.

A recent study by the

Conservation Foundation points out:
...available tools are often
insufficient to protect the parks.
The Park
Service concedes that "external threats,
though generally the most serious, are
receiving little attention...because they are
considered more complex and much more
difficult to deal with."
The serious impacts
of projects outside the parks indicate that
more must be done.
Conservation Foundation, National Parks for a New
Generation— Visions, Realities, Prospects 143 (1985)
(Footnote ommitted).
Available tools are, indeed,

inadequate to protect the parks

from external development, as the Conservation Foundation
suggests, but not because the Park Service does not have the
authority to protect the parks, but because of a lack of imagina
tion and aggressive stewardship on the part of the Park Service
in the face of hostility from other entities.

When a unit of the

National Park system is threatened by external development, the
Park Service must explore and develop alternatives to the
proposal which could fulfill the needs the project is designed to
meet without threatening park values.

Practically, this is the

only way to ensure that electric generation, mineral extraction^
or high-level nuclear waste storage, which are almost always
touted as essential to the national interest and critical to the
local economy, will not override conflicting park values, for
example, based upon aesthetics,

recreation or solitude.

More

over, to the extent this approach is linked to economic efficien-
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could minimize the pitfalls, failures, and increasing

hostility, especially in the western states, to government
control and regulation.

After all, who can argue with protecting

our parks and at the same time using our natural resources in the
most economically efficient way?

Many park-threatening activi

ties are not the most efficient economically, but rather the
result of historic business patterns, subsidies, and long-stand
ing, but no longer appropriate governmental preferences which
continue,

for the most part, because of inertia.

The most

effective way to change government and private sector inertia is
to force these entities to take a look at other ways of doing
business by considering alternatives.

This would include a fair

financial comparison between the proponent's project and feasible
alternatives.
Since most park-threatening development is capital inten
sive, such as power plants and large dams, alternatives such as
conservation and increased efficiency will not only be more
benign environmentally, but, for the most part, economically
superior based on both private investment criteria and public
resource utilization.
ties,

This is particularly true when externali

i.e., degradation of natural resources not captured in the

market, are taken into consideration, and the enormous economic
benefits derived from tourism in the parks are included in the
analysis.
In those few cases where the economics of a park-threatening
project may be superior to the alternatives, the limited govern
3

ment and private money earmarked for park protection could be
allocated to recapture leases, purchase non-federal land or
development rights.

This approach recognizes that people are

willing to pay to protect the natural and cultural values of the
parks.

Of course, under certain circumstances if a proposed

project would substantially harm park values and impair the
visitor experience,

to the extent it could be called a nuisance,

compensation may not be necessary.
This proposal,

relying on the use of the market,

most part, to protect the parks,

for the

is similar to proposed reforms

in allocating western water rights.

See S. Williams, A Market-

Based Approach to Water Rights: Evaluating Colorado's Water
System,

in Tradition,

Innovation, and Conflict:

Perspectives on

Colorado Water Law (to be published by the Natural Resources Law
Center, University of Colorado Law School— Fall 1986).
Williams' suggestions for protecting instream uses,

Judge

including

"the aesthetic contribution of water flowing freely in a stream"
is directly applicable to protecting the natural and cultural
values of the parks.
The first step in this process is to determine the signifi
cant natural and/or cultural values a park is intended to protect
in order to evaluate whether a proposal may jeopardize a park and
impair the visitor experience.

Many of the statutes and proclam

ations establishing the parks contain information which will be
useful in establishing these values.

Moreover, numerous publica

tions by the Park Service and others provide detailed information
4

on the significant natural and cultural values of each park.
Alternatives to a project which could harm park values would
then be explored.

For example, as an alternative to a large

power plant, conservation, cogeneration, and small-hydro, could
be considered in combination.
The Park Service has recognized the need to develop this
kind of approach:
The National Park Service cannot remain
on the sidelines and expect to reject a
proposed project merely because it poses a
potential threat to park resources or park
values.
As Federal Land Managers, we must be
prepared to identify viable alternatives in
those situations where proposed development
activity would damage the park.
State of the Parks, supra at 35.
Professor Sax has also suggested this type of approach in his
analysis of the internal management practices of the Park
Service:
If the goal is to encourage contem
plative recreation in the parks, the way to
do it is diligently to look for ways to meet
other recreational demands more effectively
at existing sites, and to scrutinize more
carefully claims of need and demand.
The
strategy is to increase the burden that there
is no alternative except the use of the
parklands....
J. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails:
Reflections on
the National Parks 66-67 (1980).
(emphasis added).
There are historical precedents which demonstrate the
importance of developing and promoting alternatives to avoid harm
to the parks.

Mastbaum, No Park is An Island:

A Simple Solution

for the Thorny Problem of Park Protection (see Appendix A).
5

The

efforts of the Park Service to develop alternatives to the
logging of Sitka spruce in Olympic National Park during World
War II are described in National Psi,; Service War Work (Dec. 7,
1941 to June 30, 1944), relevant portions of which are found in
Appendix B.

The alternative scenario developed by the

Environmental Defense Fund to protect Bryce and Zion National
Parks from the massive Allen-Warner Valley Energy Project is set
out in Appendix C.
A clearly defined requirement to consider alternatives when
important park values are threatened, hopefully, would lead to
increased cooperation between the Park Service and other federal
agencies, state and local governments, and commercial interests.
These entities could jointly seek alternatives that would meet
the needs the park-threatening development was intended to
satisfy, while avoiding harm to the parks.

This type of coopera

tion is virtually nonexistent today, given competing and con
flicting responsibilities and goals.

See, e.g., Keiter, On

Protecting the National Parks From the External Threats Dilemma,
20 Land and Water L. Rev. 355, 394 n. 233 (1985).
As stated above, the obligation of the Park Service to
consider alternatives should not be limited to development on
federal lands or activity subject to a federal license or permit,
but also development on state or private land.
case, alternatives could include:

1) land exchanges;

3) purchase; 4) purchase of development rights;
and 6) nuisance-type litigation.
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In the latter
2) zoning;

5) condemnation;

While the Park Service has ample legal authority,
responsibility,

indeed the

to adopt a program to consider alternatives to

park-threatening development, political realities suggest the
need for legislation that requires the program suggested.
The following areas are discussed below:

1) the authority

and responsibility of the Park Service under its organic act; 2)
establishing the significant natural and cultural values a park
is intended to protect; 3) consideration of alternatives under
the National Environmental Policy Act; and, 4) the authority of
the Park Service under its organic act when read together with
the Constitution's Property and Commerce clauses to protect parks
from external development on non-federal lands.
II.

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE ORGANIC ACT
The organic act which establishes the National Park Service

and National Park System provides the framework for management
and protection of the system.

It directs the Park Service to

administer the parks:
...by such means and measures as conform
to the fundamental purpose of said parks,
monuments, and reservations, which purpose is
to conserve the scenery and the national and
historic objects and the wildlife therein and
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in
such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.
16 U.S.C.

§ 1 (emphasis added).

A House Report on the 1916 act states that the primary
purpose of the park service bill is to preserve "nature as it
exists." H.R. Rep. No. 700, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916).
7

A 1978 amendment to the organic act reaffirms the authority
and duty of the Park Service to protect the national park
system.

It provides,

in part, that:

...The authorization of activities shall
be construed and the protection, management,
and administration of these areas shall be
conducted in light of the high public value
and integrity of the National Park System and
shall not be exercised in derogation of the
values and purposes for which these areas
have been established....
16 U.S.C. § la-1.
The Senate Report on the 1978 amendment emphasizes that:
The Secretary [of the Interior] has an
absolute duty, which is not to be compro
mised, to fulfill the mandate of the 1916 Act
to take whatever actions and seek whatever
relief as will safeguard the units of the
National Park System.
Senate Report 95-528, 95th Cong.,
(Oct. 21, 1977) (emphasis added).

1st Sess.,

9

In the National Rifle Association v. Potter, 628
F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1986), the court,

in upholding regulations

prohibiting hunting and trapping within units of the National
Park System, quoted from a memorandum by former Secretary of the
Interior Work, which it found to be a contemporaneous interpreta
tion of the organic act entitled to "considerable deference":
...[t]he duty imposed upon the National
Park Service in the organic act creating it
to faithfully preserve the parks and monu
ments for posterity in essentially their
natural state is paramount to every other
activity."
Id. at 910.
The organic act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to
8

make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary or proper for the use and management of the parks." 16
U.S.C.

§ 3.

In the litigation concerning the protection of Redwood
National Park, the court held that the organic act and the
Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 79a et_ seg., required the
Secretary of the Interior to take affirmative actions to protect
Redwood National Park from logging on adjacent land which was
endangering the trees the park was created to protect.

Sierra

Club y. Department of the Interior, Id. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).

The

court's decision appears to be based upon both statutory obliga
tions and a trust responsibility. 376 F. Supp. at 95.

("In view

of the analogous trust responsibility of the Secretary of the
Interior with respect to public lands...and the... specific set of
objectives which the provisions of the Redwood National Park Act
were designed to accomplish...").
In a later opinion in this litigation,

the court held that

the federal "defendants unreasonably, arbitrarily, and in abuse
of discretion have failed to exercise and perform duties imposed"
by "the organic act and Redwood National Park Act." 398
F. Supp.

284, 293 (1975).

requested,

However, after the Secretary had

inter alia, funds from the Office of Management and

Budget to purchase adjacent land, legislative action to regulate
private actions beyond park boundaries and the Justice Department
to sue the timber companies, he had met his duty to protect the
park and it was up to Congress to provide sufficient funds for
9

park protection.

424 F. Supp. 172 (1976).

In Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980),
the court recognized that the organic act and its 1978 amendment
require the Secretary to protect park resources from activities
beyond park boundaries.

If water development activities outside

of park boundaries were:
...a real and immediate water supply
threat to the scenic, natural, historic or
biotic resource values of Glen Canyon
National recreation Area or Grand Canyon
National Park, the Secretary must take
appropriate action.
Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the court concluded that while the Secretary had
broad discretion concerning the discharge of his park protection
duties, the discretion was not unlimited.

Id.

Finally, the

court found the Secretary's obligation to protect the parks was
statutory and to the extent the Redwood National Park decisions
suggested or found an independent trust obligation,
court disagreed.

the Andrus

The practical distinction between a statutory

and trust obligation to protect the parks from external develop
ment, however,
However,

is not clear at this point.
it is clear from the organic act,

its legislative

history, and court decisions interpreting it, that the Park
Service has the authority and responsibility to protect units of
the National Park System from incompatible external development
which threatens important park values.
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III.

PARK VALUES
The natural and cultural values a park was set aside to

protect can be determined from the enabling legislation, presi
dential proclamation, or from numerous descriptive materials
prepared by the Park Service and others.
Units of the national park system can be created by specific
legislation, se_e, e.g., 16 U.S.C.
201 (Grand Canyon),

16 U.S.C.

presidential proclamation.

§ 21 (Yellowstone), 16 U.S.C. §

§ 401 (Bryce Canyon), or by

16 U.S.C. § 431.

These acts and

proclamations may contain a statement of purpose concerning the
significant natural and cultural values the park was set aside to
protect.

This information can be important when a park is

threatened, to demonstrate the adverse effects on park values and
the visitor experience.
For example, North Cascades National Park was established
"[i]n order to preserve for the benefit, use, and inspiration of
present and future generations certain majestic mountain scenery,
snow fields, glaciers, alpine meadows, and other unique natural
features...."
established

16 U.S.C.

§ 90.

And Canyonlands National Park was

"[i]n order to preserve an area in the State of Utah

possessing superlative scenic, scientific, and archeologic
features for the inspiration, benefit and use of the public...."
16 U.S.C. § 271.
Since many of the enabling statutes do not contain detailed
information on park values, it may be necessary to resort to the
large body of literature that exists, prepared by the Park
11

Service and others, describing the important natural and cultural
values of the parks.

E.g.:

National Park Service, Dept, of the

Interior, National Park Portfolio (6th ed. 1931); F. Tilden, The
National Parks (3rd rev. ed. 1986)

(ed. by P. Schullery); Sierra

Club, Guides to the National Parks, Rocky Mountains and the Great
Plains (1984); Desert Southwest (1984); Pacific Southwest and
Hawaii (1984); and, Pacific Northwest and Alaska (1985);
A. Haines, Yellowstone National Park— Its Exploration and
Establishment (1984)

IV.

(prepared for National Park Service).

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)

commands all federal agencies to: "[ijnclude in every recommenda
tion or report on proposals for legislation and other major
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by responsible officials
on...(iii) alternatives to the proposed action....

(42 U.S.C.

§

4332(c)(iii).)
NEPA also requires federal agencies to "study, develop and
describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts
concerning alternative uses of available resources."

(Id. § 4332

(E).)
Section 4332(E) is not limited to "major federal actions" as
is § 4332(c).

E.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 834-36

(2d Cir. 1972), cert, denied. 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
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Professor Rodgers states § 4332(E) is:
..."supplemental to and more extensive
in its commands" than is, section
102(2)(c)(iii) [42 U.S.C. § 4332(c )(iii)],
particularly as it requires not only the
study and description of appropriate alter
natives, but also that they be "developed."
This directive imports not mere lip service
to and discussion of alternatives; it
presumes a degree of serious consideration,
perhaps some preliminary research, contin
gency planning, and the assignment of
personnel and equipment to pursue the
possibilities.
Section 1020(E) [42 U.S.C. §
4332(E)] may require a discussion of alter
natives not only in greater depth, but also
in wider range, perhaps including an indica
tion of the "optimum" use of the resources at
state.
W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 724 (1977)
omitted).

(citations

The regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) provide that:
Each agency shall be capable (in terms
of personnel and other resources) of com
plying with the requirements enumerated
below.
Such compliance may include use of
other resources, but the using agency shall
itself have sufficient capability to evaluate
what others do for it. Agencies shall
*

*

*

(d) Study, develop, and describe alternatives
to recommended courses of action in any
proposal which involves unresolved conflicts
concerning alternative uses of available
resources.
This requirement of section
102(2)(E ) [42 U.S.C. § 4332(E)] extends to
all such proposals, not just the more limited
scope of section 102(2)(c )(iii) [42 U.S.C. §
4332(2) (c) (iii) ]» where the discussion of
alternatives is confined to impact
statements.
40 C.F.R.

§ 1507.2(d).
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When park values are threatened by proposed development on
federal land or by activities which require a federal license or
permit, other responsible federal agencies, as well as the Park
Service, must consider and develop alternatives to the proposal.
The CEQ regulations provide detailed directions on considering
alternatives and resolution of conflicts between federal agencies
on environmentally unsatisfactory proposals.
1501.6, 1502.14, 1503.4, part 1504, 1505.2(b).

See 40 C.F.R.

§§

The obligation of

federal agencies to consider alternatives to proposed agency
actions and the scope of that obligation are discussed in, inter
alia:
1) Jordan, Alternatives Under NEPA;
Toward
an Accommodation, 3 Ecol. L. Q. 705 (1973);
2) Picher, Alternatives Under NEPA:
The
Function of Objectives in an Environmental
Impact Statement, 11 Harv. J. on Legis. 595
(1974).
3) Comment, The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969: What "Alternatives Must an
Agency Discuss?, 12 Colum. J. L. &
Soc. Probs. 221 (1976);
4) Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978);

5) Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d
88 (2d Cir. 1975); and,
6) City of New York v. U.S. Department of
Transportation, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983),
see also the district court's opinion in this
case which was reversed by the Second Circuit
on other grounds.
539 F. Supp. 1237, 127681.
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V.

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO PROTECT PARKS FROM ACTIVITIES ON
PRIVATE LANDS
The National Park Service has broad powers under its organic

act when read together with the

Constitution's Commerce Clause,

U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and Property Clause,
U.S. Const, art IV, § 3, cl. 2, to protect parks from development
on non-federal lands which threatens important natural and
cultural values of units of the National Park System.

See, e. g.,

Frank and Eckhardt, Power of Congress Under the Property Clause
to Give Extraterritorial Effect to Federal Lands Law:

Will

"Respecting Property” Go the Way of "Affecting Commerce"? XV
Nat. Res. Lawyer 663 (1983); Gaethe, The Boundary Waters Canoe
Area— Wilderness Act of 1978; Regulating Non-Federal Property
Under the Property Clause, 60 Ore. L. Rev. 157 (1981); L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 232-44 (1978); Sax, Helpless Giants:
The National Parks and Regulation of Private Lands, 75
Mich. L. Rev. 239 (1977); Knight v. United Land Association, 142
U.S. 161 (1891); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897);
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); United States
v. County Board of Arlington, 487 F. Supp. 137 (E. D. Va. 1979).
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (468
U.S. 288 (1984)), the court recognized that the "network of
National Parks...are unique resources that the Federal Government
holds in trust for the American people," id. at 290, and "the
Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the
National Parks are adequately protected."

ic3. at 297.

Activities on private land within park boundaries
15

(inholdings) which threaten park values are subject to regulation
by the Park Service.

Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th

Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).

There is no

reason to distinguish between activities on private land,
whether within or without park boundaries,
essential park values.

that threaten

When park-threatening activities are

proposed for non-federal land, the Park Service should consider,
inter alia:

1) land exchanges;

purchase of development rights;

2) zoning;

3) purchase;

4)

5) condemnation; and 6) nuisance-

type litigation.

VI.

CONCLUSION
The use of alternatives, as a means to protect the parks

from incompatible external development,

as suggested above,

within the authority of the Park Service.

is

However, because of

the pressure applied on the Park Service by other federal
agencies, state and local governments, private development
interests, and politicians, Congress should adopt a clear
legislative program that would force consideration of alter
natives when important natural and cultural values of a park are
potentially jeopardized.

To the extent this approach relies on

economic efficiency, as opposed to government control,
or at least minimizes the hostility towards regulation,
especially in the the western states.

16

it avoids,

A P p e W D i/ d .

No Park is An Island: A Simple
Solution for the Thorny Problem
of Park Protection

for the benefit and enjoyment of the people," and placing
its enormous natural resource potential off limits to private
resource development interests was a dramatic step.
However, Yellowstone, like all of the early national parks of
the West, was an island in the vast American wilderness
and because of the great abundance of land, commercial
interests did not feel threatened. Indeed, certain business
interests, such as the railroads, became major supporters
of the parks, providing not only access, but also offering a
wide variety of services for tourists.

By
David Mastbaum
David Mastbaum is an attorney practicing in Boulder,
Colorado. He is a graduate o f the University of Michigan
Law School. He was lead counsel for the Environmental
Defense Fund in the Allen-Warner Valley proceeding,
involving the construction of a large proposed energy
project near Bryce and Zion National Parks. He also
represents the environmental iptervenors in the JuniperCross Mountain case before the Federal Energy Regu
latory Commission, which involves the construction of two
dams on the Yampa River above Dinosaur National
Monument. He has climbed, skied, run, and walked in most
of the western National Parks. Mr. Mastbaum was a fellow at
the Natural Resources Law Center during the spring
semester, 1986.
"Simplification of Means and
Elevation of Ends is the Goal"
- Henry David Thoreau

"The Loch" — Rocky Mountain N.P., CO. Photo by Bill Sontag.

The year 1864 was a particularly savage one in the
fratricidal conflict between the federal government and the
confederate states. In May alone, during the battles of the
"Wilderness" and "Spotsylvania Courthouse," Grant lost
over 36,000 soldiers and Lee’s losses exceeded 17,000.
It was during this year, also, that President Lincoln signed
into law a bill ceding to California, for use as a park only, and
for all time, the ‘"cleft' in the Granite Peak of the Sierra
Nevada," the incomparable valley—Yosemite— and the
nearby Mariposa Big Trees, the magnificent Sequoiadendron Gigantea. This legislation, passed and signed at
the height of Civil War misery and brutality, was the seminal
point in the eventual birth of the national park system,
which Joe Sax of Michigan Law School calls one of "the
few unambiguous triumphs of American public policy," and
Wallace Stegner, the respected historian, writer, and
conservationist, simply calls "the best idea we ever had.”

The national park idea was a success. Newspapers and
magazines, caught up in the uniqueness and romance of
creating great outdoor museums, supported the parks
strongly and often. People flocked to the parks and
western politicians pushed for new parks to be estab
lished.
By 1916, eighteen parks existed and Congress and the
President recognized the need to establish a compre
hensive and systematic protection scheme. The National
Park System Organic Act was adopted and a National Park
Service was created to manage the parks "in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations."
The first Park Service Director, the charismatic and
indefatigable Steven Mather was a master of the public
relations game, and he made certain the word got out
about these parks. He achieved his goal, probably beyond
his wildest expectations. Visitor increases, especially with
the coming of the automobile and its new highway system
were staggering.
Today the system has over 330 units, a potpourri of
America's natural and cultural heritage— from the great
natural parks, to the historical parks, to the very popular
urban recreation areas. This amounts to nearly 80 million
acres—one percent of the land in the continental United
States and fourteen percent of Alaska. In 1985, these
parks had over 250 million recreation visits.

Evolution of the National Park Idea
The Yosemite bill was the first time federal land had been
dedicated to a non-utilitarian purpose. It marked the
beginning of a change in the notion, which had been the
cornerstone of American public land policy up to that time,
that nature should be subdued and used, to the idea that it
should be respected, indeed preserved. This trans
formation, probably, had its roots in the writings of the
famous early nineteenth-century traveler and painter of
American Indians, George Catlin, and the great trans
cendental philosophers of New England, Thoreau and
Emerson.
The thrust of the 1864 Yosemite legislation—America's
unique natural wonders required special protection if they
were to be enjoyed by future generations—was formally
translated into the national park idea with the creation of
Yellowstone National Park a few years later in 1872.
Setting aside an area larger than Rhode Island and
Delaware combined, "as a public park or pleasuring ground

Managing and Protecting the Parks
Despite this enormous popularity, indeed, in part be
cause of it, all is not well with the parks. Severe over
crowding at some parks, along with pressure from political
and commercial interests to take advantage of the
bonanza, means that crucial internal management policies,
about the type of recreational experience that the parks will
offer, must be shaped. Matters that require attention
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include limitations on the number of visitors, entrance and
user fees, determining how much of the park system
should remain as wilderness or primitive areas, and the
type of facilities that should be made available.
Park decision-makers are being forced to shape the
future of these great enclaves with a shrinking budget,
despite increased visitation, and in a political arena where
the major actors seem genuinely confused about park
management, given the tension between their conven
tional political wisdom of less government and the obvious
need to protect the crown jewels of America's public lands.
Joe Sax, in his thoughtful book, "Mountains Without
Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks," tackles the
internal management quagmire well. While one may
disagree with Sax's rendition of why the parks were
created and for whom, he has proffered sensible solutions
designed to restore and preserve the parks. These
solutions don't require a lot of money, but an awareness
that in visiting a national park, one should ”[p]ut aside the
plastic alligators of the amusement park" and focus on
nature, which "taken on its own terms, has something to
say that will you will be glad to hear."
External Threats to the Parks
The greatest challenge to the national parks system,
however, is not correcting the course of internal man
agement policies, but incompatible development beyond
park boundaries. Examples of external park-threatening
activities can be found throughout the system.
Yellowstone's famous geysers are threatened by
proposed geothermal development. The critical habitat of
its endangered grizzly bears is threatened by oil and gas
exploration and development. The burgeoning demand
for domestic, commercial, and agricultural water in south
Florida has impaired the natural flow into Everglades
National Park, endangering the park's fauna and flora. Oil,
gas, and coal exploration and timbering are threatening
Glacier's bears and elk by jeopardizing habitat. At Dinosaur
National Monument, which straddles the Colorado-Utah
border, proposed dams would reduce and alter stream flow
endangering riparian plants and wildlife.
The thorny problem of external threats raises as many
issues as does attempted reform in that arcane kingdom
known as western water. While the Constitution's
Commerce and Property clauses, the Organic Act of the
Park Service, and the specific legislation required to create
a national park all suggest that the Secretary of the Interior
has an affirmative obligation to protect the parks from
threatening development on adjacent lands, in practice
the too-general commands in these laws do not provide
sufficient muscle for a well-meaning, but weak and weary
Park Service.
Moreover, other federal, state, and local environmental
and land use laws, while establishing general standards,
do not take account of the special natural and cultural
values for which the parks were created, and therefore fail
to protect them. Finally, and perhaps the crux of the
problem, cooperation between the National Park Service,
other federal agencies, and state and local governments
with regard to park protection is difficult, at best, given the
competing and at times conflicting responsibilities and
goals of these entities. For example, the Department of
Energy viewed Park Service concerns about the proposed
siting of the high-level radioactive waste dump, a stone's
throw away from Canyonlands National Park in south

eastern Utah, as the ravings of a single-purpose agency
with little or no understanding of a serious national
dilemma.
The problem of incompatible development beyond park
boundaries is one of relatively recent vintage. During most
of the first one hundred years of their existence, the
national parks were protected, for the most part, from
external development by their isolation. However, be
ginning in the 1970s the natural buffers around the parks
rapidly began to disintegrate with increased demand for
timber, minerals, hydrocarbon fuels; and urban en
croachment. In addition, air quality degradation in and
around some parks from a combination of old and new air
pollution sources, some of which are situated hundreds of
miles from any park, creates an administrative nightmare
with all of the accompanying technical difficulties, political
sensitivities, and economic consequences.
The Saga of the Kaiparowits Plateau
The enormous vulnerability of the parks to development
beyond their borders and the ephemeral nature of their de
facto buffers was dramatically brought to the country's
attention in the isolated desert country of south-central
Utah in the early 1970s. In 1972, then Secretary of the
Interior, Rogers C.B. Morton, announced a plan to build
enough new power plants in the Southwest to produce an
additional thirty thousand megawatts of capacity. The
flagship of this scheme, the Kaiparowits project, was
originally planned as a mine-mouth, five-thousand mega
watt (later reduced to three thousand megawatts), coalfired plant. It would have been been the largest single
power plant ever built. The project was to be financed
primarily by California utilities, to whom most of the energy
would go.
The proposed project site was within a 250-mile radius of
the "Golden Circle” of southwestern desert parks— at the
time comprising more than 25 percent of the country's
national park land. This area contains some of the most
majestic and unusual desert landscape in the world. The
local people, county and municipal governments, and the
State of Utah strongly supported the project because they
saw it as a panacea for a depressed economy with chronic
unemployment. However, air pollution from the project
would have significantly reduced the magnificent vistas in
this mysterious land of red rocks, deep blue sky, intricate
carved canyons, and bizarre rock formations—land set
aside as national parks for all the people.
Primarily because of increasing construction costs,
reduced demand for energy in California, and strong public
support for park protection (especially after Robert Redford
appeared on Sixty Minutes to discuss what the Kaiparowits
project would do to the "Golden Circle” of parks), the
utilities abandoned the project in 1976. Even after
Kaiparowits was scrapped, however, and despite numer
ous studies which established that very few jobs would be
created directly for local people because of the skills
required, and that tourism was the best hope for the
economy of southern Utah, local support for massive
energy development remained high, with a symbolic
environmentalist, Robert Redford, being burned in effigy
in Kanab, Utah.
The Kaiparowits controversy should have triggered an
awareness of the need for a systemwide Park Service
strategy to ensure that the parks would be protected from
external threats. The problems of protecting national parks
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from development beyond their borders were focused
sharply— a project offered in the national interest which
would impair essential park values, conflict between the
Park Service and other pro-development federal agencies,
and strong local support for the project. However, the
death of the project and the election of Jimmy Carter,
perceived to be pro-park and pro-environment, lulled
people to sleep.
Redwood National Park: Designed to Fail
The mid-1970s also saw an intense struggle to save
Redwood National Park from the effects of logging
operations on adjacent lands, which were causing severe
erosion and stream sedimentation and, thereby,
threatening to destroy the veiy trees the park was
intended to protect. Redwood National Park was created in
1968. The political compromises surrounding the estab
lishment of the park's boundaries ignored ecological
principles, particularly the need for watershed protection
necessary for the survival of the giant trees. Unlike most of
the other great national parks in the West, which were
created long before adjacent development posed a
problem, Redwood's boundaries were drawn to ensure
that logging would continue unabated on abutting lands
which also ensured that the Park would fail.
The responsibility and authority of the Secretary of the
Interior to protect Redwoods was litigated and, in a series
of three somewhat confusing court decisions, that
responsibility and authority were established. However,
despite the mandatory duty of the Secretary to protect the
park from external threats, the Interior Department lacked
sufficient funds to purchase adjacent lands—the only
realistic solution— and the court found the Secretary had
done all that he could. The ball was now passed to
Congress.
Congress did act in 1978 and authorized additional
funds to protect and rehabilitate the Park. Congress also
realized, at the time, that parks were vulnerable to in
creasing development beyond their boundaries and
amended the Park Service Organic Act. It added vague
and general language about the "high public value" of the
park system and the need to manage the system to protect
"the values and purposes for which these areas have been
established."
Unfortunately, this rhetoric, like the 1916 statute, while
well-meaning and establishing good policy objectives,
neither provides the specificity nor creates the nondiscretionary duty which would ensure that the Park
Service, in the face of strong opposition from other federal
agencies, local governments, and commercial interests
(whose projects are often touted as essential to the
national interest) can meet its obligation to protect the
parks.

Bryce Canyon N.P., Utah. Photo by Bill Son tag.

Canyon and only about three miles from its scenic Yovimpa
Point overlook, hundreds of miles of pipeline to transport
the coal (in semi-liquid form) from the mine to the power
plants, a dam, and reservoir. This cumbersome proposal
was the kind of outlandishly complicated stuff that
technological satirist Rube Goldberg's cartoon character,
Professor Lucifer Gorgonzola Butts, might have con
cocted.
The absurd and unnecessary complexity of the project,
however, was not the real problem. Air pollution from the
power plants would have had a serious effect on Zion’s and
the region’s air quality. The strip mine near Bryce Canyon
would have imperiled the magnificent panorama from the
southwestern part of the park. Mining operations would be
visible from Yovimpa Point and other parts of the park, and
there would have been disturbing noise from blasting and
machinery operation heard throughout the park. Moreover,
the project would cost a lot more than alternatives that were
also environmentally better and would avoid harm to the
parks.
Most of the five billion dollars required to build the project
was to come from California's two largest electric utilities.
Therefore, before the project could proceed, a certificate
of public convenience and necessity was required from the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The CPUC
had for years paid lip service to the notion that cheaper
energy alternatives such as conservation, cogeneration,
small-hydro, and geothermal should be the first choice of
utilities before nuclear and coal plants. The availability and
cost of these alternatives were, therefore, central issues in
the proceeding, which lasted over 100 days. The evidence
(to the surprise of even the CPUC and its staff) was
overwhelming—a combination of alternative energy
sources could replace Allen-Warner Valley and would not
only be cheaper for rate payers, but also would provide
substantial benefits for the utilities shareholders. The
utilities, after the close of the hearing, but before the
CPUC could issue its decision, saw the handwriting on the
wall and abandoned the project in favor of the alternatives.
This meant, of course, that California could meet its
energy needs without jeopardizing the important natural
values Bryce and Zion were established to protect.
Ironically, President Carter and his Interior Department,
which had done so much for the national park system by
adding millions of acres of parkland in Alaska, instead of
supporting and advocating the alternatives which could

Allen-Warner Valley— Parks vs. Energy
The conflict between park values and development on
adjacent land took center stage in the late 1970s. A mas
sive energy project, identified by its proponents as es
sential to the national interest, was pitted against the
esthetic and recreational values of two very popular
national parks.
The Allen-Warner Valley Energy system called for two
coal-fired power plants (one only 17 miles upwind from
Zion National Park) with a combined capacity of 2500
megawatts, a large strip mine virtually abutting Bryce
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have avoided harm to Bryce and Zion, embraced AllenWarner Valley and even attempted to undermine the
California proceeding. Luckily, the attempt was not
successful.
The administration saw this project as a way to reduce
dependence on unreliable and expensive foreign oil
supplies at the time of the Iranian hostage crisis and placed
it on the "Critical Energy Facilities" list, a fast-track for
favored projects. They saw Allen-Warner Valley as a
symbol that the administration (contrary to the opinion
polls) was not inept, at least in the energy field, and could
make a big energy project happen. Apparently smaller,
cheaper, and more environmentally benign alternatives,
which could also reduce the use of oil, were not as
symbolic as big coal plants and untested synfuel schemes.
The well-meaning Park Service, despite its clear legal
authority to protect the parks and despite the command of
the National Environmental Policy Act that, where conflicts
exist in using resources alternatives should be pursued
vigorously, was caught between its trust responsibilities
and the illogical, politically motivated, energy policy of the
President.
The CPUC proceeding had provided a forum to examine
alternatives to Allen-Warner Valley, and the system worked
despite the hostility of the Carter Administration. While
Park Service personnel informally supported the effort to
develop alternatives which would avoid harm to Bryce and
Zion, they did not actively develop and promote alter
natives or participate in the California proceedings. Yet,
there was strong historical support for this type of
aggressive and vigorous stewardship.
Protecting Olympic's Sitka Spruce—
A Paradigm of Effective Stewardship
When World War II
broke out, the frames of
airplanes, for the most
part, were made of
wood. The shortage of
metals at the start of the
war made the need for
timber to construct airframesparticularlyimportant. Sitka spruce wood
was
ideal for this
purpose, and the most
concentrated and acces
sible stands of Sitka
spruce were those of
Olympic National Park.
Olympic National Park
Sitka Spruce — Olympic National Park.
is
located
on
a
Photo by D. Huff
peninsula
on
the
western edge of Washington State. The Pacific slope of
the park is a primeval rain forest with magnificent conifer
stands, which grow up the lower slopes of the glaciercarved Olympic Range. These mountains have about sixty
glaciers and rise to nearly 8,000 feet. Sitka spruce grows
very well under the ideal conditions found on Olympic's
western slopes.
The WarProduction
Board—the federal agency
responsible for ensuring
adequate war materials—
Northwest timber and commercial interests, and Great
Britain and France (with an acute need for airframe timber)
placed substantial pressures on the Park Service to allow
logging of Sitka spruce in Olympic. Then Park Service

Director Newton Drury, with support of the Secretary of the
Interior, the tough and resourceful Harold Ickes, began
actively to pursue the availability of alternatives to Sitka
spruce to avoid or at least minimize the sacrifice of Olympic.
Understanding the tension between park preservation and
the harsh realities of war, Drury confronted the issue
directly:
...[T]he virgin forests in the national parks should
not be cut unless the trees are absolutely essential
to the prosecution of the war, with no alternative,
and only as a last resort. Critical necessity rather
than convenience should be the governing
reason for such sacrifice of an important part of our
federal estate.

Clearcutting — Olympic National Forest Photo by D. Huff

The National Park Service sought out alternative
supplies of Sitka spruce as well as substitute materials for
constructing airframes. Substantial and accessible stands
of these trees were found in British Columbia and Alaska.
Moreover, increased supplies of aluminum became
available, a material that was found to be better than wood
for airframes. Thus, there was no need to log in Olympic
and the War Production Board withdrew its order to the
Park Service.
The Park Service strategy of aggressively investigating
and pursuing alternatives to Olympic's Sitka spruce
worked. Undertaken in the midst of World War II, with all of
its patriotic fervor, it is a clear example of the kind of
stewardship needed to protect the national parks now, as
external threats loom larger and larger. However, despite
having clear authority and responsibility actively to seek out
alternatives when parks are threatened, without a specific
and unambiguous legislative command, as the AllenWarner Valley case illustrates, the Park Service may not be
as bold as it was under the leadership of Drury and Ickes
during World W arll.
Some Final Thoughts
In a report entitled State of the Parks— 1980, initiated by
Congress and prepared by the Park Service, the magni
tude of the external threats issue becomes too apparent.
While the report is not perfect (its underlying data are
certainly difficult to decipher), its central conclusion is
beyond dispute—the parks are in trouble from in
compatible development on adjacent land. The Park
Service, in this report, specifically recognizes the impor
tance of a park protection strategy based on developing
alternatives to park-threatening activities:

The National Park Service cannot remain on
the sidelines and expect to reject a proposed
project merely because it poses a potential threat
to park resources or park values. As Federal Land
Managers, we must be prepared to identify viable
alternatives in those situations where proposed
development activity would damage the parks.

Keiter, "On Protecting the National Parks from the External
Threats Dilemma," 20 Land and Water L. Rev. 355
(1985).
Sax, "Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the
Regulation of Private Lands," 75 Mich. L. Rev. 239
(1976).

Yet, nearly six years have passed since State of the
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threatened by external development. While Congress has
considered some legislation to protect the parks from
external threats, these legislative proposals, for the most
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additional clout for the Park Service, and they have gone
nowhere. It is true that the Park Service has ample legal
authority and, in fact, the legal responsibility to establish
the procedures that would ensure the kind of alternatives
review suggested above. Yet the political reality is that
resource development, these days, is seen by too many
politicians as more important than protecting the natural
and cultural values of the national parks. However,
because so many millions of people from all walks of life
have found this great and unique American institution to
be so important a sanctuary, the choices we make today
about protecting the parks will be a good measure of the
quality of our society.
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1.

Sitka Spruce Problem.

Sitka spruce, which grows in Washington and Oregon, British
Columbia, and Alaska, is the most desirable sourct of lumber for
use in the manufacture, of airplanes. Since the First World War,
much of the most accessible supply of Sitka spruce had been cut and
used for other purposes than airplane manufacture, largely because
of the change from wood to aluminum in airplane construction. With
the advent of the new war in Europe, the supply of metal became in
adequate and suitable woods, particularly Sitka spruce, were in
urgent demand for airplane manufacture by the United Kingdom and
France .^)
On May 6, 1939, Secretary Ickes, as Administrator of Public
'Works, had allotted #1,750,000 of Public Works funds to the Na
tional Park Service for the acquisition in the 6tate of Washington
of a corridor along the Queets Fiver between Olympic National Park
and the Pacific Coast, and its extension northward along the cost
to Ozette Lake, for parkway purposes. The lands contemplated for
purchase within the Queets Corridor amounted to 13,353 acres and
•were estimated to contain 51,616,000 ft. B. M. of Sitka spruce in
mixture with other species.
In the Ocean strip the contemplated
acreage was 37,00? acres and the estimated stand of Sitka spruce
was 75,103,000 ft. B. M., but for the most part inaccessible and
not of a quality suitable for airplane stock. Later, due to a
shortage of funds to purchase.all of the area originally contemplated,
these acreages and estimates were reduced to 11,731 acres for the
Queets Corridor, with an estimated stand of 39,763,000 ft. B. M. of
Sitka spruce of which 6,017,000 ft. B. M. were rated as first class:
and 33,071 acres for the Ocean Strip, with an estimated 57,660,000
ft, B, f-1. of Sitka spruce, 12,319,000 ft. B. M. of which were rated
first class.
/^After the entry of C-reat Britain and France into the war in
September 1939, the demand for Sitka spruce airplane lumber from
the Pacific Northwest to help meet the needs of those countries
became quite acute/) The Queets Corridor contained some of the
best and most accessible of the remaining Sitka spruce most suitable
for airplane lumber, and therefore became the objective of searchers
for spruce to meet these war requirements. The Poison Logging Company, owners of some of the land and timber proposed for condemnation
in the Queets Corridor, were logging spruce in that area, part of
which was destined for Great Britain and France. This coiwiany ivrote
to the Secretary under date of May 3, I9 I1O, requesting authority to
continue the logging of spruce on its lands -within the corridor and
on other lands within the corridor in which it held an interest.
The question as to the acuteness of the spruce airplane lumber
situation was referred by th<- Secretary's office to Mr. Lee Muck,
at that time [Jir. ctor of For-st;. in the Department. A memorandum

tlat'.d May 17, 19b 0, i’or Mr. bur Lew i.n this regard was prepared
.jointly by Chief Forester John D . C offnan of t.he National Park
Service and Mr. Lee Muck. As a result of the study of this situa
tion, some of the spruce lands contemplated for condemnation we re
excluded from the acquisition propram, and on some of the other
lands retained in the propram the owners were permitted, through
stipulations entered in the condemnation proceedings, to log
spruce and Douglas-fir on their lands, thus averting interference
with the v/ar needs of the United Kingdom and France. This re
leased a large part of the airplane spruce in the Queets Corridor.
The passage of Lend-Lease legislation, which was approved
March 11, 19b1, and the increasing tempo of defense preparations
by the United States, created a greater demand for airplane spruce
lumber, accompanied by numerous requests that the Queets Corridor
and Olympic National Park be opened to the logging of Sitka spruce.
Continuing studies were made in the field and in 'Washington as to
the spruce airplane lumber requirements for the United States and
our allies, and as to the possibility of supplying an increasing
proportion of the needs for the United Kingdom by increased produc
tion in British Columbia and the initiation of spruce production
from the national forest in southeast Alaska. The question of
substitute species was also given attention-.
Close touch was maintained in Washington, D. C. with
Lumber and Lumber Products Division of the Vfer Production
-with members of Congress from the State of Washington, and
other sources of information relating to the Sitka spruce
tion.

the
Board,
with
situa

The National Park Service viewpoint was expressed in Director
Norton B, Drury’s memoranda of November 18, 19b 1, to the First
assistant Secretary and is summarized in the following quotation:
(1) "Selective cutting" in portions of the-Queets
Corridor and Coastal Strip might be authorized as a last
resort if immediate public necessity in the emergency as
distinguished from the convenience of specific operators,
can be shown.
(2) This will be a distinct sacrifice of park values
in the interest of national defense. Selective cutting,
together with the activities incident thereto, will largely
destroy the qualities for which these lands are being ac
quired .
(3) Legislation to permit logging in Olympic National
Park should be resisted.
(b) In order to insure an adequate supply of airplane
spruce, and at the same time to relieve the pressure on the
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Olympic National Park, the possibility of utilizing the
largo spruce resources in Alaska should be investigated
at once, with a view to making this large body of sprue*1
available for purposes of national defense.
The lands in the Queets Corridor- purchased by the Federal Gov
ernment from Public Works funds for partway purposes are not a part
of Olympic National Park and arc; therefore not subject to the pro
visions of law precluding commercial sales of timbe>r from national
park lands. As the pressure for Sitka spruce airplane stock be
came more intensive, the representatives of the War Production
Board suggested the release of government owned Sitka spruce in
the Queets Corridor as a contribution to the war program. This
meant a distinct sacrifice of parkway features, but in order to
assist the war program and at the same time hoping to lighten the
pressure for Sitka spruce from national park lands, the Service
recommended to the Secretary the approval of a sale of spruce and
Douglas-fir on government ovmed lands within the Queets Corridor,
to be marked on a careful selective basis, and with provision for
retention of a forest screen along the road. The Secretary ap
proved and, after advertising, a sale of 3,000,000 board feet of
Sitka spruce and 800,000 board feet of Douglas-fir was made to
L. J- Esses, of Montesano, Washington, the only bidder, on Feb
ruary 6, 19^3 - Delays in cutting operations by the purchaser and
modifications in the cutting area later reduced this sale by ap
proximately a million board feet.
On January 20, iylj3, F. K. Brundage, Western Log and Lumber
Administrator for the War Production Board wrote the Department
pf the Interior setting forth the critical need for Sitka spruce
/and requesting that the Hoh River and 3ogachiel River areas within
'Olympic National Park be opened at an early date for the cutting
of high quality spruce and Douglas-fir.
j

Beginning in I9 I4O close touch was maintained with Colonel
Wm. B. Greeley, Secretary-Manager of the West Coast Lumbermen's
Association, Seattle, Washington, who is one of the best informed
men on the timber and lumber situation in the Northwest. Oppor
tunities for conference with Colonel Greeley occurred during his
trips to Washington, D. C., and during the visits of Service of
ficials to Seattle, Washington. The monthly reviews of the lumber
situation issued by the Yfest Coast Lumbermen's Association were
obtained and read with care. Similar contact -was also maintained
with M r . Brundage after his appointment to the post of Western
Log and Lumber Administrator for the War Production Board. Both
of these authorities on the spruce situation counseled that the
National Park Service should hold itself in readiness to make
spruce available from Olympic National Park if and when that be
came essential for the prosecution of the war program, and should
m the meantime develop a definite plan as to the manner in which
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such action could be initiated without delay v.'h- n the need arrived.
Both declared the absence of logginr within the national park had
not up to that time delayed tin war program, but they believed that
home of file park spruce would be needed and that the National Park
fervio should be ready and willing to make the sacrifice.
As the pressure for spruce from Olympic Nntional’Park grew iy in
tensity', National Park Service efforts grew apace to obtain accurate
statistics of the supply of spruce timber,'both in this country and in
British Columbia, and the production from each of these sources;
the amounts required by the United States as compared with the
amounts required by the United Kingdom; the proportion of the
United Kingdom spruce requirements furnished by the United States
as compared with the amount furnished from British Columbia; what
species furnished satisfactory substitutes for spruce airplane
stock, and the abundance and accessibility of the timber stands
of such substitute species.
These studies required a large amount of investigation in the
Northwest by National Park Service officers; the obtaining of the
best available statistics of the spruce resources of British
Columbia; a visit to the Forest Products Laboratory at Madison,'
Wisconsin, to ascertain the facts regarding the qualities of
spruce and spruce substitutes for aircraft manufacture; visits to
airplane factories in the vicinity of Chicago manufacturing train
ing planes for the Army and Navy; obtaining of information from
the Forest Service, from the Department of Commerce and from Army
representatives; and conferences with members of the Lumber and
Lumber Products Division of the War Production Board.
The officials of the Lumber and Lumber Products Division were
quite cooperative in making available the confidential figures as
to United States Army and Navy estimates of requirements, which
varied greatly from time to time, and also the figures relating
to production in this country of spruce, noble, fir, western hem
lock, and Douglas-fir aircraft lumber and the amounts of each sup
plied to the United Kingdom and to the United States. J These
statistics indicated that the supply of Sitka spruce aircraft
lumber produced in the United States was very carefully divided
between the United States and the United Kingdom. It was, however,
impossible to ascertain the amount of Sitka spruce that was fur
nished to the United Kingdom from British Columbia. These sta
tistics were held by the Canadian government as confidential war
information. Without that information it was impossible to de
termine whether Canada was exerting herself to supply all possible
aircraft spruce to meet the requirements of the United Kingdom or
whether the United States was being forced to shoulder the larger
share of the burden while the spruce forests of British Columbia
were being conserved as compared with the Sitka spruce resources
of .ashinrton and Oregon. \ It appeared as if all efforts to solve
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;,his question were being shunted aside when they reached the L- ndLoase authorities who were responsible for the aircraft lumber ship
ments to the. United Kingdom. However, in August 19h3, there finally
appeared publicity on spruce production in British Columbia, pub
lished in the Pacific Coast lumber .iournals, which indicated that
much greater activity had oecn injected into spruce production by
government controlled Aero Timber Products, Ltd. of Canada with
greatly increased supplies of aircraft lumber from British Columbia.
T'ne sale made in the Queets Corridor failed to halt the demand
for the release of ..spruce from within the Olympic National Park.
The Chamber of Commerce in Port Angeles, Washington, the Grays Har
bor War production Council and the Washington State Planning Coun
cil were all pressing for the release of timber from Olympic Na
tional Park. On May 6, 19li3, Director Drury, Regional Director
Tomlinson, Superintendent 'Macy, and members of his staff, and
Chief Forester Coffman met in Port Angeles with a small group reppresenting business interests and the Chamber of Commerce of that
town to exchange ideas on this subject. The Chamber of Commerce
had adopted a resolution recommending the elimination from the na
tional park and the transfer to the Olympic National Forest of
that portion of the Calawah River and Pogachiel River drainages
west of the township line bet ween Ranges 9 and 10 ’
/Test, Willamette
Meridian, and north of the township line between Townships 26 and
2? North. The intent of this resolution was clearly to make a
part of the park timber available for normal postwar needs as well
as to furnish materials needed in the war program. Mr. Drury
indicated that he was there to discuss only the question of war
needs.

J

In response to an urgent invitation to meet with the repre
sentatives of the lumber and war industries of Grays Harbor, Di
rector Drury, Regional Director Tomlinson, Superintendent Macy,
and Chief Forester Coffman met with a group of lij at a luncheon
at Aberdeen, Washington, on May 8, 191/3, arranged by C. A. Pitch-'
ford, Chairman of the Grays Harbor War Production Council. Mr.
Drury explained that the cutting of any of the live forests within
the national parks under any system of logging, however selective
and restrictive, is contrary to the principles upon which the na
tional parks were established; that once the logging of timber is
introduced, the area no longer exists as a superlative virgin
forest. Mr. Drury also explained that before consideration could
be given to logging within the national park all other available
sources of supply should be investigated and developed and there
would have to be a definite showing that the war requirements
could not be met from these other sources.
I Letters presented to Mr. Drury at this luncheon showed def
initely that the Grays Harbor interests were attempting to open
up the entire Olympic National Park to logging, with the exception
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of tin- fMrnvr small Olympic National Monument area which occupies
the highest portion of the park and contains little forest that could
be considered ol commercial character. Their demands were not re
stricted to Sitka spruce to meet the war requirements for airplane
materials, but included all species of timber needed on a permanent
basis to maintain the Grays Harbor industries after the war as well
as during the war. As at port nngeles, Mr. Drury indicated that he
•was there to discuss only the question of -war needs. Quite- a number
of the business men, and one labor representative, in attendance at
the luncheon were emphatic in their criticism of the stand taken by
the National park Service./
Under date of May 12, 19li3, P. H. Brundage, Western Log and
Lumber Administrator for the War Production Board, wrote the Aber
deen Chamber of Commerce advising them that he had in December 19lj2r
strongly urged the Lumber & Lumber Froducts Division of the War
Production Board in Washington, D. C. to take action which would
make spruce and Douglas-fir within Olympic National Park available
to the lumber industry, This was welcome incentive to the lumber
interests for the organization of a concerted movement to force
the opening of the park to logging. A resolution recommending re
duction in the area of Olympic National Park was adopted by the
Seattle Chamber of Conmerce on June 1, 19li3, and numerous editor
ials supporting this idea appeared in Seattle newspapers and in
papers published in Olympia and. in the- Olympic peninsula. The
park, however, was not devoid of friends and defenders.
This effort to open Olympic National Park to logging reached
its climax during the hearings of the House Subcommittee on Lumber
Matters in Seattle, Washington, July 12 to lli, 19ii3j when the
proponents of the scheme endeavored to obtain consideration for
logging within Olympic National Park, not only to meet war needs,
but more especially to maintain their operations in the postwar
period. The Chairman of the Subcommittee, Representative Henry M.
Jackson of Washington, informed the witnesses that the Secretary
of the Interior was prepared to release from the park whatever
timber was needed in the prosecution of the war and was not avail
able from any other source; that the Subcommittee was not author
ized to go into the matter of postwar needs; and that Congress had
settled the question of park boundaries when it enacted legislation
in 1938 establishing Olympic National Park.
In order to be prepared for prompt action if it should finally
be shown that the logging of spruce in Olympic National Park was
imperative for the prosection of the war, careful consideration was
given by the National Park Service, the Office of the Solicitor and
the Office of the Secretary to the question of the method by which
this action legally could be authorized. A careful study was like
wise made by members of the park and regional office personnel to
d> tt-rmino the- boundaries of the several spruce areas within the
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;/cstern portion of Mu. park and th*. sequence in which they should

.

sacrificed to moot war n<-<..d.«; if th-.t became necessary.
Tlac exchange oi corrosion
bot.veen thw Secretary and pv,
nan Donald M. Nelson of the war Production Board as the r-'vilt ' ^ '
Mr. Brundage *s letter of January 20, 19ii3, f ina Jly culminated \v **
Secretary Ickes* lengthy letter of September l2j, 1 9 /4 3 , listing emeasures which night help to relieve the critical Sitka spruce V*- '
ation without inroads upon Olympic National Park, and Mr. Nelson u " '
reply of Sep (.ember 23, 19li3> withdrawing the request of the War
Production Board for spruce from Olympic National Park unless fu'' '
ture unforeseen conditions should arise making a renewal of Miat
V A
reauest necessary.
v-y.

% \

c

At the hearings held in Washington, D. C., on October l l ^ n ^
,12, before the House Subcommittee on Lumber Matters, J. P h i l i p p
Boyd, Director of the Lumber and Lumber Products Division of th&c *
^
War production Board, testified that the logging of Sitka s p r u c e d l
o
from the Olympic Motional Park is not at this time necessary to
* \
meet war aircraft needs, and that the Department of the Interior
A
had been so notified. | Mr. Boyd stated that a change in aircraft
lumber requirements had occurred while discussions were in progress
between the War Production Board and the Department of the Interior;
that the decision not to construct C-?6 cargo planes of wood,changes
in other types of planes, and the increase in the supply of aluminum
available for aircraft production had helped the situation.
With increased spruce aircraft lumber production in British
Columbia, increased production from the Alaska Spruce Log Program,
and greater availability of aluminum for aircraft manufacture, tin
situation had eased very materially by October 19143"•
In the June I9 I4I4 issue of The Timberman Mr. Brundage is quoted
as stating that after September or at the latest October, and per
haps earlier, Treasury Procurement through Lend-Lease will take no
more spruce aircraft lumber for delivery to the United Kingdom.
Thus the threat of invasion of Olympic National pork by logging
appears to have been safely outridden.
The following conversation between Colonel ’ft:.'.lism B. Greeley,
Secretary-Manager of the West Coast Lumbermen•s Association, Seattle
Washington, and Director Newton B. Drury at th-. Cosmos Club, Wash
ington, D. C., on Hay 26, 19lib, epitomizes National Park Service
policy in this crisis and illustrates the spirit in which negotia
tions were conducted:
W.B.G.

Good day, sir.

N.B.D.

Good day, Colonel Greeley. Did the spruce
situation come out to your satisfaction?
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W.B.G.

As a practical matter, y<.s.

N.B.D.

v7e did what you asked of us— put ourselves in
a position where we could move- quickly if war
need were shown.

W .B .0 .

Of course I don't like the idea that when our
boys are being drafted etc., etc., it is
necessary to hold park timber to the last and
compel a showing that it is absolutely needed.
I don't think it should be sacrosanct.

N.B.D.

That's just what I do think. If it isn't
sacrosanct, it shouldn't be in a national
park.

W.B.G.

Well, I have always thought that Olympic Na
tional Park was too large.

N.B.D.

That is of course debatable. It is a separate
issue that can better be studied in calmer
times. At both meetings I attended on the
Olympic Peninsula to consider war needs, the
discussion quickly veered to the question of
using park timber to sustain local industries.
’
We were not there to discuss that. I hope to
see you in the Northwest,

W.B.G.

I hope so, too.

Good day, sir.

We might add that the final outcome of the spruce situation was
also to the satisfaction of the National Park Service.
2.

Contributions to the National Lumber Supply.

While the Sitka spruce negotiations v-/ere progressing, the Service
gave evidence of its willingness to cooperate l o y a l l y in the war pro
gram by making available needed timbers from various sources not en
tailing the mutilation of the parks. Such evidences of loyalty and
good '/fill helped the Service to withstand direct attacks on park
resources.
For instance, an unexpected source of f'ood airplane timber was
provided by the blowing down of Douglas-^ fir trees on Finley Creek,
in the Quinault River drainage within Olympic National Park, creat
ing a high fire hazard. This area adjoined privately-owned cutover
lands on which there was a considerable amount of unburned slash,
which exposed the windthrown and standing timber on national park
lands to greater danger. As a fire hazard reduction measure, a
sale of the fallen and badly leaning trees was made on July 10,19ii3,
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to the H. end D. Timber Conpany of Aberdeen, u--shingtor.,
\ch has
-suited in the renova1 of approximately 2,000,000 board feet of
timber, predominantly Douglas-fir, which was utilized in connection
with the war program.
jJ-ther ways in which the Service was able to make timber re
sources available and other minor threats to Service forested areas
-re discussed below:
Dead Chestnut for Extract YTood. Shenandoah National Park, Blue
Hid go parkway and Great Smoky Mountains National Park lie within the
natural range of the chestnut (Castanea dentnta), and include some
heavy stands of this species. The chestnut, was one of the most
valuable commercial species in eastern United States until the chest
nut blight (Endothia parasitica), an exotic fungous disease, first
observed in this country in Nov/ York City in 190h, spread through
the; eastern forests, resulting in the death of the chestnut. Chest
nut wood contains a high percentage of tannin and the standing dead
trees retain commercial value for a long period of years for certain
types of lumber, for veneer core stock in the manufacture of plywood
a.nd for tannin extract wood.
A considerable quantity of dead chestnut was cut along the
skyline drive in Shenandoah National Park by the Civilian Conserva
tion Corps some years back as a fire hazard reduction project and
public safety measure, and for improvement of the scenic and
aesthetic features. At that time an attempt was made to interest
a tannin extract plant in Luray, Virginia, in this material, but
the financial condition of the company was such that it w s not
prepared to haul and utilise the mv tarial oven with no charge for
it. The wood was accordingly used so far as possible for lumber
v.'Lthin the nark and for firewood in the CCC c a m s , and was also
nado available to the local residents who were willing to haul it
y•
Some inquiries wore node before the war by manufacturers of
casket wood and tannin extract as to the availability of dead
civ stnut within Great Smoky Mountains National park. Examination
by pur it officials showed that logging operations within that park
'■'or.Id result in severe erosion and injury to p; rk vulvas.
During the war, especially during that period when enemy sub,ntrines were operating actively in the Caribbean wators, causing a
shortage m the importation of tannin extract wood, the demand for
<-no stnut in order to meet war rccuirem nts for tannin became very
-•cute. Request was made by tannin extract manufacture
ana a"
ai.SO
ur r: and
r Yr notion1
yy representatives of the Vfcr Deiaarti?it end tie
dn-ard that consideration be giv. u by the W.'tiervl i ri/ f:, rv ic . to
j'1’-' rt-lease of some of t.ho dead ch stnut which r
)V ''<‘*j iy •!v ’ji u
■~or-Z the Jliv Mi' g,, parkway, A study was m-d..
i.h rj-•rt nor os
-■mule cead chestnut stands and H was found that
me vr 1 of
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Executive Summary

California's two largest utilities are planning
to build a series of new coal plants, beginning with
the 2500 MW A l l e n - W a m e r Valley energy system in Utah
and Nevada.
This analysis looks at an alternative:
getting the same amount of new energy from conserva
tion and various alternative energy sources. It
finds that such an alternative is fully feasible,
and that if the utilities pursued it instead of
A l l e n-Wamer Valley and other planned development,
they would save approximately $500 million (in present
value) for their ratepayers between now and 1992.
Because the full energy yield of the planned
coal plants can be obtained through utility development
of conservation and alternative sources instead,
providing the same energy in the same time frame with
the same reliability, and because to do so is more
financially advantageous than building the coal
plants, this analysis concludes that the A l l e n - W a m e r
Valley system is unnecessary.
The results of the computer-based financial
analysis show that there is a clear choice for the
utilities (and their regulators), between building
A llen-Wamer Valley and other planned coal plants on
the one hand, and developing energy alternatives
and conservation on the other.
And the choice is
inescapable.
The analysis shows that developing
some of both, an option often proposed as a compro
mise, is financially a worst choice for ratepayers,
resulting in the highest bills of any of the scenarios
analzyed.
This is so, even accounting for the
benefits of very high reductions in oil and gas use.
(As analyzed, the development of alternatives and
conservation by themselves would reduce oil and
gas consumption in power plants by approximately 737„
and 867o respectively for the two utilities, between
now and 1992, or 59% and 627o counting cogeneration.)
The alternatives analyzed are all preferred under
California energy policy.
They include:
increased
end-use efficiency in residential, commercial and
industrial sectors; increased distribution efficiency;
and increased development of geothermal, cogeneration,
wind, and biomass.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the next decade, California's two largest utilities
are planning a major shift to coal as a source of electric
power.

The first of several new large coal projects in

which they intend to participate is the All e n - W a m e r Valley
Energy System (AWV Energy System), a 2500 MW complex which
includes two generating sites, a water project, a coal
mine, and a coal slurry transportation system in south
western Utah and southern Nevada, near Bryce Canyon and
Zion National Parks.

At the same time, the utilities plan

not to proceed with full scale development of alternative
energy sources, including conservation.
This report looks at what would happen if the two
utilities did develop alternative energy sources in
California, in reasonable and feasible amounts.

It shows

that the alternatives, which are preferred under California
energy policy, are available to the utilities in large
enough amounts that they can fully match the AWV Energy
System and other projected power plants, in terms of energy,
capacity, reliability, and timeliness, for all purposes in
cluding reduction of oil and gas use.

Significantly for

the ratepayers who must foot the bill, developing the alter
natives is also a cheaper way to meet the same energy needs.
In other words, the AWV Energy System and the other con
ventional power plants on the drawing board are unnecessary.
Whether the AWV Energy System is needed or not is a
question now pending before the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC), since the two utilities, Southern
California Edison Co.
Co.

(SCE) and Pacific Gas and Electric

(PG&E) have applied for a certificate of public conve

nience and necessity for that specific project.
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The

decision is particularly important, because the data
strongly suggest that participation by SCE and PG&E in
the AWV Energy System would seriously impede utility
efforts to increase energy efficiency and develop alter
native generating resources, which the CPUC five years
ago called "the most important task facing utilities,"
and which it then stated would be "a key question in
future rate proceedings and decisions on supply authori
zation."— ^

The California Energy Commission also has

made the point:
The next 12 to 18 months can make a critical
difference in California's energy future.
Energy Commission studies of alternative
energy futures for California indicate
that, without new initiatives, we may miss
major opportunities to obtain the benefits
of a transition to conservation, renewable
energy sources and other preferred techno
logies . Our studies suggest that California
is already committed to a largely conven
tional energy future through the 1980s, and
will increasingly depend on this future
unless dramatic steps are taken to include
conservation and alternatives in energy
planning.
California Energy Commission,
1979 Biennial Report at 55.
Simply stated, the AWV proposal puts California at an
energy crossroads, where a decision must be made between
competing methods of energy growth.
This report, which finds one choice clearly preferable
to the other in terms of financial impact, risk, and state
policy, relies on a computer-based analysis of the finan
cial consequences of SCE's and PG&E's announced supply
plans (the utilities' scenario), compared side by side
with the financial consequences of a plan made up of
reasonable energy alternatives in feasible amounts (the
EDF scenario).

An earlier version of the analysis was
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applied by the Environmental Defense Fund to PG&E's
supply plan in 1978, caused the CPUC to begin its own
investigation into the extent to which energy alternatives
could replace large new central station plants for PG&E,
and led to the conclusion last year that PG&E could be
2/
making much greater use of the cogeneration alternative.—
The measures in the EDF scenario are already known
to the utilities, and all of them are already relied on
to some degree in the utilities' supply plans.

The utili

ties' scenario simply puts less emphasis on them than does
EDF's scenario.

These measures include increased efficiency

in residential, commercial, and agricultural end-uses
of electricity, and increased development of geothermal,
cogeneration, wind, and biomass.

Footnotes

1/ CPUC Decision 84902 (1975).
2/ CPUC Decision 91109 (1979).
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II.

PURPOSE OF REPORT

The purpose of this report is to evaluate the economic
consequences for California if the AWV Energy System is
developed, and to compare these systematically to the
economic consequences of developing a set of reasonable
alternatives that would yield the same results.

The eco

nomics are vital because California ratepayers and utilities
would have to pay for a large part of the AWV Energy System
as proposed;

if there are reasonable alternatives that are

financially more attractive in comparison,

then both state

policy and common sense dictate that these alternatives
should be developed instead.
Thus, the economic analysis performed for this report
goes directly to the question of need for the AWV Energy
System.

If there is an economically preferable alternative,

which is feasible and reasonable,
is not needed.

then the AWV Energy System

SCE and PG&E have asserted the need for AWV

to the CPUC, and have put need in issue by applying for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity for the
project.— ^

The CPUC has explicitly recognized that "a

thorough evaluation of the economic effects of the [AWV]
project compared to other alternatives" must be performed
as part of its consideration of need for the project.— ^
The focus of this report is precisely that kind of compre
hensive financial comparison using computer simulation.
The U.S. Department of the Interior recently concluded
that energy alternatives are a complete and feasible substi
tute for the AWV Energy System.— ^

The Department's Draft

EIS evaluates "energy conservation and the development of
alternative energy sources" as an alternative to the AWV
Energy System, and finds that alternative to be reasonable,

-4-

technically feasible, and capable of supplying not only all
capacity represented by the proposed 2500 MW project, but
also a surplus of more than 4000 additional MW over the
needs of SCE and PG&E.— ^

The specific measures considered

are very similar to those in the EDF scenario.

They include

conservation and load management, cogeneration, geothermal,
wind, and biomass.— ^ The Draft EIS considers only those al
ternatives that could be installed by 1991, based on tech
nical, economic and other feasibility criteria, and which
are not already in the SCE and PG&E resource plans available
to the Draft EIS a u t h o r s . T h u s ,

at the Draft EIS stage,

federal analysts confirm that energy alternatives, developed
in reasonable and feasible amounts, could fully replace
the AWV Energy System.
The Draft EIS does not, however, purport to make any
evaluations of comparative cost.

The analysis reported

here provides that missing link, by evaluating the costs
of the AWV Energy System and a program of alternatives in
exhaustive detail, and comparing them side by side.
Analysis of alternatives is also particularly appro
priate in this case, because the proposed AWV project,
due to its location and characteristics, would have an un
usually severe impact on majestic national trust lands and
on vital indigenous water resources.

The AWV Energy System

is thus likely to face considerable difficulties in obtaining
necessary permits and approvals, and thus its reliability
as a source of electricity in the projected time frame is
uncertain.

If there is an alternative which avoids these

impacts and risks, at no higher cost, the CPUC should be
particularly interested in pursuing that alternative in
this case.
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Footnotes

1/ CPUC Appl. 59308.
The Application was accepted for
filing on January 9, 1980.
2/ CPUC Appl. 59308, Decision 91968, p. 4 (1980).
3/ U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manage
ment, Allen-Warner Valley Energy System Draft Environ
mental Impact Statement pp. S-15 through S-16, 2-40
through 2-53, and 4-143 through 4-148 (June 20, 1980)
(Draft EIS).
4/ Ibid.
5/ Ibid.

6/ Ibid., p. 2-46.
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III.

A.

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS

METHOD

The analysis reported here makes an economic compari
son of two resource plans, or scenarios.

The first scenario

is what is set forth in the officially reported resource
plans of SCE and PG&E, which include development of the AWV
Energy System.

The second scenario, or resource plan,

consists of the development of preferred alternative re
sources, and does not include the AWV Energy System. Both
scenarios meet the same energy needs for SCE and PG&E, in
the same time frame.
The basic thrust of the analysis is comparative.
provides information to answer the question:

It

all other

things being equal, what financial difference would it make
to follow one scenario or the other.

To make a fair com

parison, the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario are
assembled and analyzed using a common set of economic
assumptions in both cases.

(With a few exceptions, these

are the same assumptions used by the utilities themselves
in planning.)

Thus, when financial results are calculated

and compared, the differences are the differences caused
by the use of different energy resources, and not differences
caused by the use of varying economic assumptions (e .g .,
different results caused by assuming different future in
flation rates) .
Each scenario is constructed with a large body of data
sufficient to capture the relevant financial effects at
approximately the same level of accuracy as that achieved
by utilities themselves in supply planning.— ^

The financial

consequences of each scenario are derived by computer
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simulation using the same calculating methods in both c ases.
These methods, contained in a financial model designed for
computer use, are closely patterned after the financial
models used by utilities themselves in calculating the
financial consequences of their own resource plans for in
ternal planning purposes.
The model used is the ELFIN computer model, designed
and owned by the Environmental Defense Fund.

ELFIN simu

lates the financial and generation system operations of
a utility given the utility's construction plans, generating
2/
resources, fuel costs, etc.—
The result is a comprehensive
and systematic financial simulation for the utilities'
scenario on the one hand, and the EDF scenario on the other,
throughout the 1980-1992 planning period, which can then
be compared.
A full comparison is complicated by effects that may
occur beyond the 1980-1992 planning period.

These effects

are highly uncertain due to the nature of any economic
assumptions for the post-1992 (and, indeed, post-2000)
period.

Nevertheless,

for purposes of completeness, they

have been explored in this analysis by calculating lifecycle costs of the proposed projects and their alternatives.
Details are given in the Technical Appendix.

Footnotes
1/ The data are the utilities' own, with a few exceptions.
See the Technical Appendix.
2/ EDF's ELFIN model was the subject of a special hearing
before the CPUC.
Order Instituting Investigation
(Oil) No. 26. The updated version of the ELFIN model,
used in this analysis, differs in some respects from
the version that was reviewed in the Oil 26 hearing.
See the Technical Appendix.
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B•

DESCRIPTION OF UTILITY AND EPF SCENARIOS

Table 1 displays the resource additions planned in
the utilities'

scenario and the alternative resource

additions in EDF's scenario in the 1980-1992 period.
These are shown in terms of installed capacity.
The utilities'

scenario includes development of two

major coal projects besides the AWV Energy System:

SCE's

California Coal project (620 MW for SCE's planning area in
the 1991-1992 period) and PG&E's Montezuma facility (1600 MW
in 1989-1990).
EDF's scenario substitutes additional end-use
efficiency improvements, geothermal, cogeneration, wind,
and biomass for the utilities' planned coal development.
Year-by-year details of the resource additions in EDF's
scenario are described in Section VI, below.

Figure 1

illustrates the sources of energy production in the
utilities'

scenario and the EDF scenario in 1992.

Figure 2 illustrates the reserve margins in 1992
for the utilities'
the utilities'

scenario and the EDF scenario.

Both

scenario and the EDF scenario provide

reserve margins that are more than adequate.

In fact,

1992 reserve margins are 42%, for SCE and 29% for PG&E
under the EDF scenario, and 357, and 34% under the utilities'
scenario, not counting wind generating capacity.-/
These reserve margins need not be considered excessive.
They are simply the result of shifting oil- and gas-fired
generating facilities from active use to reserve status.
Since adequate reserves will be available, the need for
new facilities to meet peak loads is not an important con
sideration for SCE and PG&E beyond the very-near term.-/
For the same reason, load-leveling measures such as load
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TABLE 1
Capacity Additions 1980-1992

(MW)
SCE
Utility
Scenario

EDF
Scenario

Geothermal

170

1009

Cogeneration

374

1630

Wind

249

1333

0

180

End-use Efficiency

96

289

Fuel Cells

26

26

1665

0

- 547

- 547

Nuclear

2322

2322

Hydro & Purchases

1180

1180

Total

3535

7422

Biomass

Coal
Oil & Gas

PG&E
Utility
Scenario
Geothermal

EDF
Scenario

1301

1741

Cogeneration

992

1719

Wind

223

1333

Biomass

130

290

End-use Efficiency

124

526

2645

0

82

82

2253

2253

531

531

8281

8475

Coal
Oil & Gas
Nuclear
Hydro Pump storage
6c Purchases
Total
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FIGURE 1
Energy Production -- 1992
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utility
edf
scenario

FIGURE 3
Oil and Gas Consumption
(millions of equivalent barrels*)

* One barrel = 6.25 million Btu
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management are not as attractive for SCE and PG&E as they
may be in other cases, and are, therefore, not considered
in this report.
Figure 3 illustrates the level of oil and gas use in
the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario in 1980 and
1992.

Footnotes
1/ In fact, some portion of wind generating capacity can
be reliably counted for purposes of meeting peak load.
Reserve margins are more than adequate, however, even
if no firm wind capacity is included.
2/ In the 1980-1982 period reserve margins are narrow.
The EDF scenario is more reliable than the utilities'
scenario in the near-term because end-use efficiency
improvements are available much sooner than the AWV
Energy System.
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IV.

RESULTS

Using computer simulation, detailed financial results
for the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario are pro
duced.

When those results are compared, three principal

findings are apparent:
1.

There are economic benefits for SCE's and PG&E's
ratepayers if the EDF scenario is developed
instead of the utilities' scenario.

Benefits

over the 1980-1992 planning period are approxi
mately $500 million in present value terms,
measured in today's dollars.
2.

There are financial benefits for SCE's and PGocE's
shareholders if the EDF scenario is developed
instead of the utilities' scenario, in terms of
quality of earnings and reduced risk to utility
shareholders, which suggest that, in monetary
terms, shareholders, at the very least, are
equally well off, and may be better off, under
the EDF scenario.

3.

The EDF scenario is of equal or greater financial
feasibility than the utilities' scenario.

Detailed financial results of the computer simulation are
presented in table form in Appendix II.

A.

RATEPAYER EFFECTS
For ratepayers, the financial effect of a given

scenario of energy development by their utility is the
amount of money that will be collected from them to pay
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for it; in other words, the revenues that the utility
must collect to support that development.

The value of

those revenues is measured here in present-value 1980
dollars.— ^
The EDF scenario, if developed instead of SCE's and
PGSeE's current resource plans, would result in a presentvalue savings of $500 million ($200 million to SCE's
customers and $300 million to PG&E's) over the 1980-1992
period.

See Appendix II, Tables 1 and 2.

Life-cycle

analysis also suggests that there would be a net benefit
for ratepayers under the EDF scenario.-

The $500 million

saving represents approximately 57„ of the present value of
the revenues required to support the utilities planned
3/
coal projects.—
Simply stated, the AWV Energy System
and other coal projects planned by SCE and PG&E will cost
their ratepayers $500 million more between now and 1992,
than the energy alternatives set out in the EDF scenario,
measured in today's dollars.

B.

SHAREHOLDER EFFECTS

The computer simulation uses the assumption that, in
each scenario, the utilities' shareholders will receive
the same rate of return on equity.

(The purpose of this

assumption is to permit a fair comparison of the effect on
ratepayers, undistorted by rate of return differentials.)
Thus, by definition, shareholders will be equally well off,
in gross dollar terms, in both scenarios.
However, results indicate that shareholders would
prefer the financial outcome of EDF's scenario because
the quality of earnings in that scenario is improved.— ^
See Appendix II, Tables 3 and 4.
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This improvement would bene

fit shareholders (and ratepayers as well) as a result of
improved bond ratings and reduced financing costs.

In

addition, the EDF scenario reduces the risks to share
holders of major construction delays, since it avoids
dependence on large, central station facilities with
long lead times.

C.

FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY

The EDF scenario involves a level of direct con
struction expenditures, not counting the Allowance for
Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC), that is higher
than the level of the utilities'plans.
Tables 5 and 6 .

See Appendix II,

Thus, it would appear that the EDF scenario

is more expensive than the utilities’ scenario.

This

notion is incorrect, however, because it fails to measure
the ultimate benefit to ratepayers from reduced financing
costs (due to lower AFUDC) and reduced fuel costs.
The financial feasibility of the EDF scenario and
the utilities' scenario can be evaluated by examining the
detailed results of the computer simulation.

The finan

cial results indicate that the level of construction expen
ditures in the EDF scenario is as readily supportable as
the utilities' planned levels.

First, AFUDC is signifi

cantly lower in the EDF scenario.
7 and 8 .

See Appendix II, Tables

Second, key financial ratios show that the finan

cial health of the utilities is at least as great under
the EDF scenario as under the utilities' scenario.
Internal financing as a portion of total construction
expenditures is as great under the EDF scenario, as compared
to the utilities' plan.

See Appendix II, Tables 9 and 10.

Bond interest coverage--utility operating income as a
multiple of bond interest payments--is at least as great
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in the EDF scenario as compared to the utilities' scenario.
See Appendix II, Tables 11 and 12.
D.

ADDITIONAL SCENARIO:

COAL PLUS ALTERNATIVES

A computer simulation was made for an additional
scenario in which the utilities' planned coal development
takes place along with some development of alternatives.
Two alternatives are developed (cogeneration and end-use
efficiency measures), and the level of oil and gas use is
reduced even further in the 1990s than in the utilities
scenario or the EDF scenario.-^
The purpose of analyzing this scenario is to investi
gate what would happen if a combination of coal development
and alternatives is

used,

in order to achieve a very

high level of oil and gas reduction.

It is generally

assumed that oil and gas reduction results in financial
benefits.

However, developing this scenario turns out

to cost ratepayers an extra $600 million in 1980 presentvalue over the 1980-1992 period, as compared to the EDF
scenario; and it is actually more expensive than
the utilities' scenario as well.— ^

In other words, using

coal development to achieve very high levels of oil and
gas reduction can be financially counter-productive.
The results of this scenario indicate there is a
necessary choice which must be made, between the utilities'
planned coal development and development of preferred
alternatives.

E*

Both together are a poor financial option.

ADDITIONAL SCENARIO;

LOW FUEL COSTS FOR COAL

This scenario accepts the utilities' estimate of coal
fuel costs (including inflation) for the AWV Energy System.
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This results in a lower cost for ratepayers than the EDF
scenario (in 1980 present value terms).

Life-cycle

analysis indicates this scenario has a cost advantage in
the long term of $600 million in 1980 present value
(although in the 1980-1992 period this scenario costs
ratepayers $300 million more than the EDF scenario).
These results depend entirely on the utilities'
estimated fuel costs.

The estimated coal costs for the

AWV Energy System in 1986 are 13% to 37% lower than the
utilities' estimates for their other coal projects.-^
In addition, the utilities' estimates of annual coal fuel
inflation rates for the AWV Energy System are 1.1% below
the coal fuel inflation rates for their other coal pro
jects and .77o below their estimates of general inflation.
The current utility fuel cost estimates for the AWV Energy
System are implausible, and recognized by the utilities
8/

themselves as highly speculative.-

Therefore, the

utilities' present planning seems to be based to a large
degree on unrealistically optimistic assumptions with
regard to fuel costs for the AWV Energy System.

Footnotes
1/ A discount rate of 127» is used, which is the same
discount rate used by SCE and PG&E in Appl. 59308.
2/ Life-cycle benefits of EDF's scenario are $150 million
in 1980 present value terms.
These net benefits,
however, are not distributed evenly to both SCE and PG&E.
There is a net benefit to SCE of $200 million, while
there is a net cost to PG&E of $50 million.
The
Technical Appendix describes how these life-cycle costs
are calculated.
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3/ Over the economic life of the utilities' planned coal
— projects, the present value of revenues required to
support these projects is approximately $10 billion,
based on a 1985 levelized cost of 15.6 cents/kWh
(Additional Testimony of W.M. Gardner, CPUC Appl. 59038/
Exh. 71), a 30 year economic life, and a 127a discount
rate.
4/ Quality of earnings measures that portion of reported
earnings which is cash, excluding Allowance For
Funds Used During Construction which is a non-cash
item.
5/ SCE's oil and gas use in 1992 is 19.2 million barrels
and PG&E's is 1.5 million barrels (excluding
cogeneration) under this scenario.
Including co
generation the figures are 28.3 and 11.4 million
barrels for SCE and PG&E, respectively.

6/ The additional costs are $250 million for SCE's customers,
and $350 million for PG&E's.
Life-cycle analysis shows
that these results hold over the economic lives of the
proposed projects.
Present-value costs through the
year 2015 are $800 million greater in this scenario
(coal plus alternatives) than in the EDF scenario
($400 million for SCE and $400 million for PG&E).
7/ This comparison is made on the basis of cost per kilo
watt-hour, which takes account of differences in coal
quality and heat rate.
See the Technical Appendix,
Table 1.

8/ See CPUC Appl. 59308/Tr. 1555-66 and 1613.
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V.

IMPEDIMENTS TO THE

ALLEN-WARNER VALLEY ENERGY SYSTEM

A. INTRODUCTION

There are several regulatory and political obstacles
to development of the AWV Energy System as proposed.— ^
The existence of these obstacles raises serious questions
about the wisdom of relying on this project as a potential
source of electric power in the proposed time frame, as
well as about ultimate project costs.
The two most significant unresolved issues surrounding
the AWV Energy System are

(1) impairment of vital water

supplies in Utah, and (2) the adverse effect of the project
on Bryce Canyon and Zion National Parks.
The available data suggest that the project as pro
posed

would have serious effects on both the quality and

quantity of surface and groundwater resources in south
western Utah.

The Division of Water Rights of the Utah

Department of Natural Resources has stated unequivocally
that it will not grant water rights for the mine and slurry
line "if there is known or even suspected interference
2/

possible" with existing water rights.—

The data also suggest that the project would adversely
affect both Bryce Canyon and Zion National Parks.

The

National Park Service has made clear its very serious con
cerns about any impairment of these unique national trust
lands .If

y

In the following sections, the AWV Energy System and
some of its major components are described, and the most
significant obstacles to the development of the project as
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a reliable and economic source of electric energy are
discussed.— ^

Footnotes

1/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management
"Allen-Wamer Valley Energy System Draft Environmental
Impact Statement," June 1980.
The unresolved issues
are discussed on pp. S-16 through S-18.
2/ Letter from Gerald W. Stoker, Area Engineer, Utah
Department of Natural Resources Division of Water
Rights to J. Kent Giles, U.S. Bureau of Land Management,
June 30, 1977. Appendix 14, U.S. Dept, of Interior,
Ibid.
3/ Letter from Glen T. Bean, Regional Director, Rocky Mountain
Region, National Park Service to William Curtiss and
David Mastbaum, November 28, 1979.
Included in the
Technical Appendix to this report.
4/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land
Management, op. cit.
5/ Supplemental material explaining the technical issues
in more detail is contained in the Technical Appendix.

-22-

B.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The AWV Energy System is a joint proposal by Southern
California Edison Co., Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Nevada
Power Co., and the city of St. George, Utah, to develop
2500 MW of coal-fired capacity in Utah and N e v a d a . I t
includes a large surface and underground coal mine near
Bryce Canyon National Park (Alton mine), two coal slurry
pipelines (one approximately 75 miles long to the Warner
Valley site and one approximately 185 miles long to the
Harry Allen site) , an off-stream reservoir with a storage
capacity of 55,000 acre feet, near St. George, Utah, and two
generating complexes (Warner Valley, a 500 MW plant near
Zion National Park and Harry Allen, a 2000 MW plant in
Southern Nevada).

The Alton Mine
The proposed Alton coal mine extends to within two miles
of Bryce Canyon National Park.

The most recent information

indicates that 707, of the coal would be surface-mined and
2/

307, would be extracted using underground methods—

with

approximately 10,000 acres disturbed by surface mining
operations.
Development of the mine is dependent, in part, on the
regulatory and political acceptability of the hydrologic,
erosional, and esthetic consequences of mining in the Alton
area.

And these consequences are related, in part, to the

success or failure of efforts to reclaim the mined area
in accordance with existing federal standards.

Evaluation

of the soils , vegetation and climatic conditions at Alton
suggests that reclamation, if possible, would be very
expensive.
The Alton area's soils pose a major obstacle to reclam
ation.

Successful reclamation requires stockpiling and re-
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spreading surface soils in order to establish a "diverse,
effective and permanent vegetative c o v e r . T h e

physical

and chemical characteristics of both topsoils and over
burden in the area suggest that there' is an inadequate supply
of material that is suitable for revegetation.

Among the

physical and chemical problems are high clay content, high
sodium content, high salt concentrations, high pH, low
available moisture holding capacity and low phosphorus
availability.
Precipitation in the Alton area averages only about
16 inches per year, and is very sporadic.

The U.S. Bureau

of Reclamation concluded on the basis of a precipitation
frequency analysis that without irrigation, revegetation
efforts would fail about one-third of the time and have an
even chance of success another third of the time.— ^

The

quality of water available for irrigation ranges from
moderate to poor, and would decline as a result of raining
operations.— ^
The actual reclamation costs for the Alton field are
difficult to estimate, since a mine and reclamation plan
are not available.

It is likely, however, that these costs

would be higher than at other surface mines in the West.
Seventy to ninety percent of reclamation costs are attributable
8/
to earthmoving and grading.—
Since parts of the Alton
field are relatively steep and dissected by streams, the
earthmoving and regrading costs would be higher at Alton
than at most other western mines.
A combination of sporadic but intense precipitation,
steep slopes, and relatively impermeable soils makes the
Alton area particularly vulnerable to hydrologic damage.
During mining operations, soils and overburden would be
temporarily stockpiled.

These piles, along with the re

graded but unreclaimed areas

would be vulnerable to increased
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wind and water erosion.

The various kinds of mining-related

surface disturbances (removal of vegetation, surface strip
ping, road construction,and regrading) would increase stormflow peaks— ^ by both decreasing infiltration capacity and
decreasing the concentration time for storm runoff.
Increased stormflow peaks and sediment discharge down
stream from the mine area could increase channel and bank
erosion in Johnson and Kanab Creeks.

This could result

in the destruction of portions of alluvial terraces along
those creeks that are presently used for agriculture.

In

creased discharge of fine-grained sediment would also seal
the beds of streams intersecting the Navajo Sandstone
aquifer, resulting in a decrease in groundwater recharge.— ^
Mining in the Alton area would permanently destroy
22 springs in the area of the m i n e , and alter the flow and
quality of nearby springs.— ^
for wildlife and livestock.

These springs are essential

Their loss would be difficult

if not impossible to mitigate.
Surface mining at Alton would also have an adverse
effect on visitor experience at Bryce Canyon National Park.
Recent tests have shown that blasting at the mine site would
be audible throughout the Park and would be disturbing to
Park visitors.—

Much of the surface mine itself would

be visible from Yovimpa Point, an overlook visited by more
than 100,000 people yearly.— ^

Visibility from Yovimpa

Point could be reduced by dust from the mine by as much as
45 miles under some conditions.— ^

Park Service policy is

to protect visibility in National Parks from any perceptible
_ 15/16/
impairment.— —
Many of these issues concerning the proposed Alton mine
are discussed, in detail, in the petition filed by the
Environmental Defense Fund and others, including several
local farmers and ranchers, with the U.S. Department of the
Interior's Office of Surface Mining and Enforcement.

-25-

This petition asks that the Alton area be declared unsuitable
17/
for surface coal mining operations.—
If even a portion
of the proposed mine area is declared unsuitable, the
economics of the AWV Energy System, as proposed, would
become less favorable.

The Coal Slurry Pipeline
Alton coal would be transported from the mine to the
generating plants by two slurry lines.

A 12-inch line

would run approximately 75 miles from the Alton area to the
Warner Valley site and a parallel 22-inch line would run
approximately 185 miles to the Allen site.
The most serious water-related impediment to the AWV
Energy System is the effect of pumping approximately 9700
acre-feet per year from the Navajo Sandstone aquifer in
the Alton area to supply the coal slurry pipeline and prep
aration plant.

This is the only source of water for the

slurry.
The Navajo Sandstone is a large regional aquifer that
outcrops in a broad band south of the proposed mine area.
It dips slightly toward the north and is dissected near
the proposed mine area by southward flowing streams, chiefly
the Virgin River, Kanab Creek, and Johnson Canyon.

The main

recharge area for the aquifer is probably in the upper reaches
of these streams.—

The groundwater in the Navajo Sandstone

generally moves south, reemerging in springs and seeps to
feed the lower reaches of the same streams.

The community

of Kanab, Utah and the farms at the mouth of Johnson Canyon
are dependent on the flow of springs and wells that tap
the Navajo Sandstone.— ^

The crucial issue is the effect of

pumping the well field over the life of the project on the
supply of water to springs, streams, and wells five to
fifteen miles south of the project area.
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The U.S. Geological Survey recently completed a study
on groundwater conditions in the Alton area.— ^

This study

used data from existing wells to determine the hydrologic
characteristics of the Navajo Sandstone.

Using conservative

values for aquifer properties, this study indicates that
pumping to supply the coal slurry could cause a lowering
of the water table of 60 feet at a distance of 10 miles
after 27 years.

A drawdown of this magnitude would decrease

the flow of springs, wells and streams in Johnson Canyon
and Kanab Creek.

The area of drawdown could also intersect

the groundwater divide between the Kanab drainage and drain
ages of the Sevier and Paria Rivers, causing a shift in
groundwater from the latter basins to the former.

It could

reach the groundwater basin of the East Fork of the Virgin
River, decreasing the summer low-flow in that stream .—

'

The East Fork of the Virgin River passes through Zion National
Park, and helps maintain streamflow that supports the
endangered woundfin minnow.
Aside from decreasing the flow of springs and wells
that presently tap the Navajo Sandstone, groundwater pumping
could also decrease the quality of both groundwater and
surface water.—

This would occur because pumping would

draw more mineralized water from underlying and overlying
aquifers into the Navajo Sandstone, and increase the pro
portion of more mineralized water in streamflow.
Long-term

pumping from the Navajo Sandstone

for the coal slurry could seriously impair the water supplies
in the farming communities to the south of the proposed
mine area.

As previously noted, the state of Utah has

indicated that an application to appropriate water for the
Alton mine project will not be granted if there is even a
suspected possibility of interference with existing wells.
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The Warner Valley Water Project
Cooling and other water for the Warner Valley generating
plant would be supplied by the proposed Warner Valley water
project.

This would consist of a diversion dam on the Virgin

River, an off-stream reservoir with an annual yield of about
32,600 acre feet (ac.ft.) and a delivery system.

The

plant would use a maximum of 10,000 ac.ft./year, and 8,000
ac.ft./yr. would be used for supplemental irrigation.
Present supply systems for local communities for domestic
and other purposes are more than adequate for the next
20 to 40 years.—

Thus the annual yield of the system

would be at least 14,600 acre feet in excess of the projected
demand.
This water system would have adverse effects on both
water quality and flow regimes in the Virgin River.

Flow

in the river below the diversion would be reduced 38% on
an annual basis and over 50% during winter and spring.

Of

the 265,000 tons of sediment diverted in an average year,
53,000 tons would be returned to the river.

The average

annual sediment concentration in the river would be increased
o/

j

by as much as 807o.— '

Reduced flow, especially in a segment

of the river affected by mineral springs, would increase
the concentration of dissolved solids and increase tem25/
perature extremes.—
Reduction of flows in the Virgin River would adversely
affect the endangered woundfin minnow and the Virgin River
roundtail chub which has been proposed as an endangered species.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in its official biologi
cal opinion on the effects of the project, stated that:
...The Warner Valley project as now
proposed will be likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of the endan
gered woundfin by adversely modifying
its present habitat in the Virgin
River. The habitat is considered
essential for survival of the species

-
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and has been proposed for designation
as "Critical Habitat" as provided for
by the Endangered Species Act of 1973....£2/
The Washington County Water Conservancy District has not
agreed to the minimum flow releases deemed necessary by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.— ^

The BL1! has stated that

the water project would adversely affect the habitat of
the roundtail chub, but the Fish and Wildlife Service has
not yet issued its official opinion on that fish .—

'

The Warner Valley Power Plant
The proposed 500 MW Warner Valley power plant would
be located approximately 17 miles west of Zion National Park
and about 13 miles southeast of St. George, Utah.

The

available evidence and modeling studies show that the
Warner Valley power plant would exceed existing air quality
standards.

Sulfur dioxide emissions from the plant would

exceed the allowable increment under the federal prevention
of significant deterioration (PSD) program.

This would

occur for both Class II areas in the vicinity of the plant
29 /
and for the Class I area of Zion National Park.—
Under
certain conditions a yellow-brown haze from the plant would
30 /
be visible from points within Zion National Park.—
The resulting reduction in visibility would be a violation
31/
of established Park Service policy.—
The Warner Valley power plant could also adversely
32 /
affect two species of endangered plants.—
The solid waste
disposal area would destroy habitat and 80 to 100 individuals
of the Siler pincushion cactus.

The only known habitat of

the endangered dwarf bearclaw poppy would be disrupted by
the construction and operation of the Warner Valley plant
and water project.

One of the two existing populations

of this species occurs near existing roads between St.
George, Utah, and the power plant site; accelerated population
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growth and road use would pose an immediate threat to this
species.

Construction of the slurry pipeline near

St. George would destroy some individual plants of both
of these species.—
The Allen Plant
The proposed 2000 MW Allen power plant would be
located in Dry Lake, approximately 25 miles northeast of
Las Vegas, Nevada.

The plant would emit 41 tons per day

of sulfur dioxide, 8.2 tons per day of particulates and
136 tons per day of nitrogen oxides.

Sulfur dioxide

emissions from the plant would exceed the Class II PSD
O/ J

increment near the plant.— '

The Class I sulfur dioxide

increment would be exceeded in the potential Class I Valley
of Fire State Park.

The plant would also cause plume

blight and reductions in visible range in the Piute
Primitive Area and Valley of Fire State Park.

Emissions

from the Allen plant would exacerbate existing air quality
problems associated with the Reid Gardner plant and city
of Las Vegas.— ^
The Clark County Health District has raised a number
of issues regarding the air quality impacts of the Allen
/
plant.—
Among these are:
(1) the cooling towers will
release ammonium, which will react with sulfate to produce
aerosols and reduce visibility more than previous estimates
indicate;

(2) short-term increases in nitrogen oxides could

exacerbate ozone problems in Las Vegas as well as visibility
problems;

(3) current reliability estimates for air pollution

control equipment are overly optimistic.

A more realistic

appraisal of equipment reliability would yield more pes
simistic estimates of potential air quality problems.
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Footnotes

1/ The generating capacity of the system will be shared
among the participants as follows:
Nevada Power Co.
285 MW
Southern California Edison Co.
1045 MW
Pacific Gas & Electric
Co.
1045 MW
City of St. George
125 MW
U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management
"Allen-Wamer Valley Energy System Draft Environmental
Impact Statement," June 1980, p. S-l.
2/ Utah International,
June 1980.

Inc., Fact Sheet, Alton Project,

3/ 30 U.S.C.§1265 (b)(19); 30 C.F.R.

§816.111.

4/ U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Bureau of Land Manage
ment, and U.S. Geological Survey, "Energy Mineral Rehabil
itation Inventory and Analysis." Alton Coal Field,
Kane County, Utah," 1975.
5/ Utah International, Inc., "Environmental Assessment,
A llen-Wamer Valley Energy System, V o l . 5, Alton Coal
Field," 1975.
6/ U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, o p .cit.
7/ U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey,
Development of Coal Resources in Southern Utah, Final
Environmental Statement, Part 2, Site Specific Analysis.
8/ Daniel Weiner, Reclaiming the West: The Coal Industry
and Surface-Mined Lands, Inform, Inc. New York, NY, p.377.
9/ T. Verma, "Stripmining and Hydrologic Environment on
Black Mesa." in L. Thomas, ed., Reclamation and Use
of Disturbed Land in the Southwest, University of
Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1977, pp. 161-166.
This study showed much higher volumes and stormflow
peaks in the mined and regraded watershed than in the
undisturbed control area.
10/ G.W. Sandberg, "Hydrologic Evaluation of the Alton
Reclamation Study Site, Alton Coal Field, Utah." U.S.
Geological Survey Open-File Report 79-346, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 1979, p. 53.
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11/ U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey,
o p .cit.
12/ Personal communication with Keith Kirk, U.S. Office of
Surface Mining and Enforcement, July 1980.
13/ U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey,
o p .cit., p. A-II-19.
The figure of 100,000 visitors
is for 1976.
14/ Michael Williams, "Affidavit in support of the Petition
Before the Office of Surface Mining and Enforcement
Designating Certain Federal Lands in Kane and Garfield
Counties, Utah, Abutting Bryce Canyon National Park
and Dixie National Forest as Unsuitable for Surface
Coal Mining Operation," Berkeley, California, November
1979.
15/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Manage
ment, o p .cit.
16/ Letter from Glen T. Bean, Regional Director, Rocky
Mountain Region, National Park Service to William
Curtiss and David Mastbaum, November 28, 1979.
Included
in the Technical Appendix to this report.
17/ Environmental Defense Fund, et a l . , "Petition Before
the Office of Surface Mining and Enforcement Designating
Certain Federal Lands in Kane and Garfield Counties, Utah,
Abutting Bryce Canyon National Park and Dixie National
Forest as Unsuitable for Surface Coal Mining Operations,"
Berkeley, California, November 1979.
18/ H.D. Goode, "Reconnaissance of Water Resources of a
Part of Western Kane County, Utah," Utah Geological
and Mineral Survey and Utah Water and Power Board,
Water Resources Bulletin 5, 1964, p.62.
19/ R.M. Cordova, "Groundwater Conditions in the Upper Virgin
River and Kanab Creek Basins Area,Utah, With Emphasis on
the Navajo Sandstone," U.S. Geological Survey Open-File
Report 80-524-W, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1980, p. 121.
20/ Ibid.
21/ Personal communication with Thomas Schultz, U.S. Office
of Surface Mining and Enforcement, July, 1980.
22/ Cordova, o p .c i t .
23/ U.S. Department of the Interior, o p .cit.
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24/ Ibid.
25/ Ibid.
26/ H. Willoughby.
Memorandum to State Director, Bureau of
Land Management, from Regional Director, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Denver, Colorado, regarding the effects
of the Allen-Warner Valley Energy System, 1978.
Included
as Appendix 13, U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau
of Land Management, o p .cit.
27/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Manage
ment o p .cit.
28/ Ibid.
29/ Environmental Protection Agency, "Screening Modeling of
Harry Allen Powerplant using the VALLEY Model," Region
IX, San Francisco, California, 1978.
30/ M.D. Williams, "Warner Valley Visibility Analysis-Zion Plume Blight," National Park Service, Air Office,
Denver Service Center, Denver, Colorado, 1980.
31/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Manage
ment , o p .cit.
32/ Ibid.
33/ Ibid.
34/ Ibid.
35/ Ibid.
36/ Letter from Michael Naylor, Director of Air Pollution
Control Division, Clark County Health District, Las
Vegas, Nevada, to District Manager, Cedar City District,
Bureau of Land Management, July 17, 1980.
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VI.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES

A. INTRODUCTION
The individual components of the EDF scenario, both
end-use efficiency improvements (non-generation resources),
and preferred generation resources are discussed below.
The consequences of developing these components have been
evaluated by simulating their combined use in the electric
systems of SCE and PG&E.
to this simulation:

There are two distinct aspects

(1) economic parameters (e .g ., capital

costs and economic lives) and (2) technical parameters
(e .g ., energy production and reliability).
The economic simulation of end-use efficiency improve
ments treats these alternatives analogously to the utilities'
generation facilities

The

utilities bear the full costs

of these efficiency measures and subsequently recover these
costs from their customers in the same manner they recover
costs for conventional facilities.

The analysis accounts

for differences in tax treatment between non-generation
measures and power generation facilities.— ^

With respect

to potential differences in accounting and ratemaking treat
ment, the analysis assumes a "worst case," e.g., neither the
of subsidiary project financing to lower financing costs
of residential end-use efficiency improvements, nor tne use
of special ratemaking treatments such as a balancing
account (similar to the Energy Cost Adjustment Clause)
are considered.

.

By using this "worst case" assumption, the

results of this analysis are not tied to any particular
scheme of collecting the costs of improved-efficiency
measures.

This means the results of the analysis remain

valid regardless of how regulatory policy issues associated
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with the distribution of costs and benefits among rate
payers are ultimately resolved.
The economic simulation of the preferred generation
resources is straightforward:

The alternatives are treated

on par with the utilities’ conventional investments.

The

utilities bear the full costs of these facilities and
subsequently recover these costs from their customers.
The technical simulation of end-use efficiency improve
ments is performed by estimating the reductions in load,
both for energy and peak, that result from development of
these efficiency improvements.

Details of the estimates

are given in the Technical Appendix.
The technical simulation of preferred generation re
sources, on the other hand, is analogous to the production
simulation employed for the utilities' conventional genera
ting units.

The operating characteristics and availability

of the alternative resources is taken into account.

For

example, EDF's analysis assumes that maintenance of co
generation units cannot be scheduled in an optimal manner.
The random availability of wind generation is accounted for
by assuming average random availability at all times (despite
evidence that wind generation will have greater than average

2/

availability at times of system peak— ).

Footnotes
1J

EDF's analysis assumes that no utility tax credit
nor accelerated depreciation are available for those
non-generation alternatives which are not utilityowned.

2/
“

See testimony of R.B. Williams (CPUC Appl. 59308/Tr.
2250:12-16, and 2770:5-8).
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B.

NON-GENERATION ALTERNATIVES

The EDF scenario includes a number of measures to
improve the efficiency with which electricity is used.
These measures, which affect end-use efficiency in the
residential, commercial, and agricultural sectors, are
described in the following sections.
All of these measures achieve efficiency gains beyond
those forecast by the utilities themselves and by the
California Energy Commission in its 1979 Biennial Report.
These additional measures do not exhaust the possibilities
for increased end-use efficiency, since only those savings
which could be accurately quantified using existing data
have been included.

With more complete data on each sector,

the number of measures and the concomitant electricity
savings could be expanded.

For example, commercial build

ing lighting improvements, or additional conservation
voltage regulation programs ("Phase II") have not been
included in the EDF scenario.
The CPUC has adopted the electricity sales forecast
prepared by the California Energy Commission in the 1979
Biennial Report as a basis for determining need for the
AWV Energy System,—^

This forecast provides a complete

breakdown of anticipated electricity consumption by individual
end-uses.
It accounts for many efficiency improvements that
will occur as a result of state and federal lav;; most
importantly it includes efficiency improvements that result
from state and federal appliance efficiency standards and
state building standards.

In addition, the 1979 Biennial

Report forecast takes into account, except as noted below,
the impact on electricity use of existing utility-sponsored
programs.
The implementation of the efficiency measures included
in the EDF scenario is based largely on utility conservation

-36-

financing proposals currently being considered by the
CPUC.

These recent proposals were not included in the

1979 Biennial Report forecast.

1.

RESIDENTIAL EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS

For the residential sector, the EDF scenario includes
a set of measures to improve the efficiency of five enduses of electricity:

(a) space heating; (b) water heating;

(c)

(d) lighting; and (e) refrigeration.

air conditioning;

None of these measures involves a lifestyle change.

All

of the measures are in addition to the projected efficiency
improvements that are already included in the California
Energy Commission's 1979 Biennial Report forecast.
Table 2 summarizes the 1992 savings in each of the five
end-uses resulting from this set of efficiency improvements.
The measures to accomplish these improvements are described
below.

Sample calculations are included in the Technical

Appendix.

(a) Space Heating
The EDF scenario includes the following five measures
for electrically heated single-family homes:

sealing attic

bypasses; adding storm windows; caulking; additional R-19
insulation in attics; and weatherstripping.

Estimated

savings are based only on single-family homes of 1980 vintage
or older

remaining in 1992.

Although large potential

savings exist in multifamily dwellings and mobile homes,
as well as in improved design and construction of new homes,
they are not included because data to document these savings
are not yet available.
Average costs and savings for SCE and PG&F for each
retrofit measure are shown in Table 3.
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TABLE 2

1992 Residential Energy Savings From End-Use Efficiency
Improvement Measures In The EDF Scenario
(GWh/year)*

PG&E

SCE

Space heating

457

140

Water heating

262

292

59

31

Lighting

653

514

Refrigeration

292

381

1723

1358

Air Conditioning

TOTAL

*beyond utility programs and the California Energy Commission's
1979 Biennial Report
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TABLE 3

Average Costs and Energy Savings
of Space Heating Retrofit Measures

Average cost
per retrofit
(1980 $)

Average energy savings
(kWh/year)*
PG&E

SCE

75

463

357

Storm windows

580

1311

1009

Caulking

220

520

400

Additional insulation

470

430

330

Weatherstripping

200

237

183

Seal attic bypasses

*Wright, et a l . estimate 30% more energy for heating in
NorthernTaTTfornia than in Southern California. The
savings are adjusted accordingly.

Source:
Janice Wright, et_ al., "Supplying Energy Through
Greater Efficiency:
TKe Potential for Energy Conserva
tion in California's Residential Sector," Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory (draft), 1980.
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It is assumed that 60% of the electrically heated
1980-vintage and older single-family houses remaining in
1992 are retrofit with each measure, except "additional insula2/

tion"

for which the portion retrofitted is 48%.-

"Seal

attic bypasses" refers to identifying and eliminating air
circulation paths which reduce the effectiveness of existing
attic insulation. "Additional insulation" refers to adding
another layer of R-19 insulation onto the existing attic
insulation.

Caulking and weatherstripping serve to reduce

infiltration from small leaks, and around windows and doors.
Adding storm windows increases the low thermal resistance
of single-pane glass.
Calculations of savings and costs are contained in the
Technical Appendix.

(b) Water Heating
The EDF scenario includes two measures that reduce the
use of electricity for domestic water heating:
heaters and heat-pump water heaters.

solar water

Estimated savings

are based on retrofitting 25% of single- and multifamily
electric water heaters with solar units and 55% with heatpimp units by 1991.

The CPUC-ordered demonstration program

for utility financing of solar units (Oil 42), that will
result in retrofit of 10%, of existing electric water heaters by
1983 has been included in both the utility and EDF scenarios
as an additional program that was not accounted for in the
California Energy Commission's 1979 Biennial Report forecast.
Solar water heaters save approximately 60% of the
electricity used for domestic hot w a t e r . C o s t s

are

$3000 per single-family unit and $1000 per multifamily
unit.—

Savings from heat pimp water heaters are approxi

mately 507o.—^

The average cost is $700 per installation.— ^

-40-

(c) Air Conditioning
The EDF scenario includes one measure for single
family homes with central air conditioning:
walls with R-11 insulation.

retrofitting

This measure reduces central

air conditioning unit energy consumption by 17%, on average,
without changing the comfort of retrofit homes .-

Estimated

savings are based on retrofit of 42% of centrally air
conditioned homes of 1980 vintage or older remaining in
1992.-^

The average cost of this measure is $270.-

(d) Lighting
The EDF scenario includes a variety of light bulb
retrofit measures to improve the efficiency of residential
lighting.

They are:

(1) replacing incandescent bulbs in

older kitchens with higher efficiency fluorescent bulbs;
(2) replacing exterior incandescent bulbs with screw-in
fluorescent units;

(3) replacing 2-Way lights with screw-in

fluorescents and "Halarc" bulbs;

and (4) replacing 75 Watt

and 100 Watt interior incandescent bulbs with fluorescent
bulbs.— ^ The percentage of homes assumed to be retrofitted
ranges from 15%, to 48%, depending on the measure.— ^
Savings are estimated statewide and adjusted for SCE and PG&E
according to each utility's share of residential customers.
Average cost per home varies, according to the number of
bulbs retrofit.
Calculations of savings and costs are provided in the
Technical Appendix.

(e) Refrigeration
The EDF scenario contains two measures for increasing
the efficiency of refrigeration in residences:

(1) a program

to remove under-utilized second refrigerators; and (2) an
incentive program for purchases of refrigerators which are
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more efficient than existing state and federal standards.
To remove under-utilized second refrigerators, SCE
and PG&E have begun pilot programs of bounties, paid to

12 /

customers for their second refrigerators.—

The EDF

scenario provides for a bounty of $80 and assumes that with
such an incentive 307* of second refrigerators will be
collected.
For purchases of more efficient refrigerators, the
incentive program in the EDF scenario provides an incentive
of $30 for each refrigerator purchased from 1982-1992 which
is as efficient as the most efficient refrigerator being
marketed in 1980.

This incentive is more than double the

average premimum that customers must now pay for top effi
ciency (i .e ., the cost differential between those refrig
erators which meet current appliance efficiency standards,
13/
and the most efficient available models.)—
Savings are
based on the assumption that only half of the full potential
savings under the program are realized.
A more detailed discussion of both refrigerator programs,
including calculations, is presented in the Technical
Appendix.
Footnotes
1/ CPUC Decision 91968 (1980).
2/ Percentage based on estimates of eligibility in Janice
Wright, et a l ., "Supplying Energy Through Greater
Efficiency:
The Potential for Energy Conservation in
California's Residential Sector," Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory (draft), 1980.
For details see the Technical
Appendix.
3/ Actual^ figures range from 567» in PG&E's area to 767,
in SCE's.
California Energy Commission, "Technical
Documentation of the Residential Sales Forecasting
Model: Electricity and Natural Gas," October 1979,
Appendix L.
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4/ These estimates are used by both SCE and PG&E in their
compliance filings for CPUC Order Instituting Investi
gation (Oil) No. 42 Decision 19272.
See OII-42/Exh.
57-G (SCE) and Exh. 70 (PG&E).
5/ As reported by SCE in OII-42/Exh. 57-G.
6/ SCE estimates costs of $600-$700. Ibid.
7/ Wright et a l ., o p .cit., Appendix 3, p.25.
8/ Based on estimates of eligibility in Wright et al. ,
o p .cit.
9/ Total cost of the measure is $900; however, 707„ of the
cost is assigned to gas space heating savings.
(See
the Technical Appendix) Wright et al., o p .cit.
10/ Savings vary greatly according to the number of hours
per year a particular bulb operates.
Wright et a l . ,
o p .cit., consider usage frequency for eight different
household lights.
11/ Based on estimates of eligibility in Wright et a l . ,
o p .cit.
12/ Incentives for customers were $25 under the PG&E program
and $65 under the SCE program, with additional payments
to the charity or contractor collecting the refrigerators.
For details see the Technical Appendix.
13/ Wright et a l ., o p .cit.
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2.

COMMERCIAL SECTOR EFFICIENCY MEASURES
Although studies have reported that a large potential

exists for increased efficiency in commercial electricity
use, there are insufficient data refined enough to be used
in a systematic analysis such as EDF's.— ^

For that reason

the EDF scenario includes only one efficiency measure in
the commercial sector.
That measure is the replacement of electric water
heaters in commercial buildings with heat pump water heaters.
This measure saves about 507, of electric consumption for
2/

water heating in the average commercial building.—

The

EDF scenario assumes that 30% of commercial buildings with
electric water heating will convert to heat pumps under the
program.
Energy savings are 264 GWh/year in 1992 for SCE and
308 GWh/year for PG&E.

The Technical Appendix provides

detailed cost and savings calculations.
Footnotes
1/ A report to PG&E by Arthur D. Little, Inc., Conserva
tion Potential in the PG6cE Service A r e a , June 1980,
concludes that large potential savings exist for a
number of commercial end-uses of electricity, in
cluding lighting, refrigeration, water heating, and
space heating and cooling.
As an example, for space
heating and cooling, potential reductions by 1990 in
energy intensity below 1975 levels for existing commercial
buildings are, on average, 327, and 407, respectively.
For new commercial buildings the potential reductions
were even greater:
597, for space heating and 487, for
cooling.
A.D. Little, Table IV-14, pp.IV-78, 79.
2/ Based on savings for heat pumps in the residential
sector.
For discussion, see the Technical Appendix.
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3.

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS

Water pumping is the main end-use of electricity in
the agricultural sector.

Both SCE and PG&E have programs for

testing and adjusting agricultural p u m p s . T h e
provides for expanding these programs.

EDF scenario

Over a three year

period (1982-1984) about one-half of each utility's agricul
tural pumping customers are reached by the expanded program.
Energy savings are 94 GWh/year in 1992 for SCE and 468 GWh/year
for PG&E.

Savings and costs are derived from SCE's program

and from the California Energy Commission's 1979 Biennial
Report forecast, and are shown in the Technical Appendix.

Footnote

1/ C P U C , "Analysis of Energy Conservation Programs
of Southern California Edison Company Test Year
1981," April 11, 1980, p. 4-6.
PG&E, "Report on
1979 Energy Conservation Activities," March 31, 1980,
p. 40.
For a description of these programs, see
the Technical Appendix.
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4.

DISTRIBUTION EFFICIENCY

Energy can be saved by increasing the efficiency
of electricity distribution.

Conservation voltage

regulation--maintaining service voltages in the lower
half of the 114 to 126 volt range--is one method; up
grading the distribution network is another.
The EDF scenario includes only one measure to in
crease distribution efficiency: expansion of PG&E's
current distribution network upgrading program to con
vert primary distribution feeders to 21-kilovolt operation.
The effect of PG&E's current program is included in both
the utility and EDF scenario as an additional measure
that was not included in the 1979 Biennial Report.
PG&E's "Montezuma Study" notes that an additional 569
distribution circuits

could

be upgraded.— ^

The EDF

scenario expands PG&E's existing program to upgrade
these additional circuits, resulting in additional
savings of 290 GWh/year in 1991.— ^

Cost estimates are

based entirely on PG&E's existing program.

The Technical

Appendix provides details.
EDF's scenario does not include any additional conser
vation voltage regulation beyond existing programs ("Phase
I") already included in the 1979 Biennial Report forecast.
Although there is evidence that a significant amount of
additional cost-effective savings is available,—

data

to quantify these savings are currently unavailable.

There

fore the EDF scenario does not include any savings from
Phase II projects.
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Footnotes

1/

PG&E, "Montezuma Power Plant Project Assessment
Interim Report," May 2, 1980 (CPUC A p p l . 59308/
Exh. 64), p. VII-26.

2/

Ibid., p. VII-62.

3/

San Diego Gas and Electric plans on spending $1.45
million in 1981 on conservation voltage regulation
Phase II programs.
SCE, five times as large, is
spending half that amount:
proportional to size,
only one-tenth of SDG&E's program.
For that reason,
the CPUC staff has recommended that SCE triple its
test-year 1981 projected Phase II spending, to
$2.4 million.
(CPUC Appl. 59351/Exh. H 6 ) .
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C.

GENERATION ALTERNATIVES

The EDF scenario includes expansion of existing
utility programs for four electric-generation technolo
gies:

geothermal, cogeneration, wind, and biomass.

The

scenario does not represent the maximum amount of capacity
that could be obtained from any of these power options;
rather, it includes levels of capacity for each technology
which can be reliably achieved by 1992.
Moreover, the set of generation options included
in the EDF scenario does not exhaust the preferred
generation alternatives available in the time frame under
consideration.

Expansion of hydroelectric generation

through capacity additions at existing facilities,
accelerated development of photovoltaics, and other
measures could provide significant generation sources
by 1992.

-48-

1.

GEOTHERMAL

In their current resource plans through 1992, PG&E-/
and SCE-/ project 2211 MW and 170 MW respectively of
geothermal capacity.

EDF's scenario includes an additional

1279 MW in the same time period.

Table 4 provides a

year-by-year breakdown of capacity under each schedule.
The EDF scenario for PG&E adopts PG&E's planned dry
steam geothermal additions at The Geysers through 1988,
but includes 440 MW of dry steam capacity in addition to
the 200 MW of PG&E hot water geothermal additions in
1989-1992, for a total of 2651 MW.-/
For S C E , the EDF scenario adopts the company plan
for 41 MW through 1983, then includes 839 MW of additional
hot water capacity beyond the 129 MW planned by the company
in 1984-1992, for a total of 1009 MW.

All of EDF's pro

posed additions to SCE's plan are hot water flash
geothermal, with the alternative possibility of binary
units after 1986.

All units are at Imperial Valley

locations.
For PG&E and SCE combined, the EDF scenario through
1992 includes 3660 MW of geothermal, compared to 2381 MW
now planned by the utilities.
Discussion
California's total geothermal potential is far higher
than either the utility or EDF scenario through 1992.
The U.S. Geological Survey places the total electric energy
in identified hydrothermal systems in California at
13,800 MW, and estimates that an accessible resource base
4/
of even larger dimension remains undiscovered.—
Thus,
the only issue for resource planning purposes is that of
dependable near-term and mid-term levels of geothermal
capacity:

what pace of development is practicable.
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TABLE 4-

G e o t h e m a l Capacity in EDF and
Utility Scenarios
(MW)

PG&E
Utility
Scenario

SCE
EDF
Scenario

Utility
Scenario

EDF
Scenario

1980

910

910

-

-

1981

968

968

-

-

1982

1241

1241

-

-

1983

1406

1406

41

41

1984

1571

1571

50

150

1985

1571

1571

50

150

1986

1736

1736

59

159

1987

1791

1791

59

259

1988

2011

2011

96

409

1989

2061

2171

96

559

1990

2111

2331

170

709

1991

2161

2491

170

859

1992

2211

2651

170

1009

Sources:
PG&E -- CFH III, Form R-4A, June 1980.
SCE

-- "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 1980
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Various studies—

have evaluated the feasibility

of accelerated schedules of geothermal development; a
summary of the results of several of these is shown in
Table 5.

The yearly survey performed by the Electric

Power Research Institute (EPRI) is particularly sig
nificant since it is compiled from the utilities' own
estimates of future additions.

Table 6 shows the full

results of the 1979 EPRI survey for California.

Host

notable is the gap between the "announced" and "probable"
levels of development.

This gap--between what the state's

utilities have included in supply plans and the level of
geothermal development they themselves consider "probable"-amounts to 1765 MW by 1990 statewide, or 1200-1600 MW
for PG&E and SCE.

Dry Steam
At The Geysers dry steam field, the EDF scenario
differs from the PG&E plan by including an additional
440 MW of dry steam capacity after 1988; this results
in a projection of 2451 MW of dry steam potential
through 1992.

Independent assessments of the potential

of the dry steam field show that this additional dry

8/

steam capacity is available at The Geysers.—
Hot Water

For The Geysers hot water field, the PG&E supply
plan includes 200 MW of hot water geothermal capacity
in 1989-1992.

Although several studies have concluded

that significantly higher amounts of hot water capacity
could be operating at The Geysers by 1992— ^, the EDF
scenario includes no additional capacity for PG&E at
this location.

Other hot water fields in Northern

California, including Mono-Long Valley, Surprise Valley,
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TABLE 5
Recent Projections of Potential
Geothermal Development
(Geysers and Imperial Valley Locations Only)

(MW)
1985

1990

ci/
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1977)-

2508

4560

Interagency Geothermal Coordinating
Council (1979)b/

2670

4720

Electric Power Research
Institute (1979)c/

2154

3457

Environmental Defense Fund (1980)

1721

3040

Si /

— See footnote 5.
-^See footnote 6.
— ^This is the "Probable" forecast by California's
utilities as reported by the Electric Power Research
Institute (see footnote 7 and Table 6).

The 1985 and

1990 figures shown here have been reduced by 200 MW
and 500 MW respectively to adjust the EPRI survey, which
covered geothermal capacity statewide, to Geysers and
Imperial Valley locations only.
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TABLE 6

1979 EPRI Utility Geothermal
*
Survey

California Capacity By Year
(MW)

"Announced"

"Probable"

"Possible tl

1985

2007

2354

2739

1990

2192

3957

5517

1995

2462

5158

7608

"Announced":

"Either publicly or through PUC-type
biennial reports."

"Probable":

Estimated by California utilities;
"based on successful demonstration of
technology for using liquid-dominated
geothermal resources."

"Possible":

Estimated by California utilities;
"based additionally on removal of
institutional barriers, governmental
incentives and R&D support."

See footnote 7.
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and Glass Mountain, could also provide several hundred
megawatts, with development beginning in the late 1980s .—

■

However, the EDF scenario assumes development at these
locations is deferred until after 1992.
For Imperial Valley locations, the EDF scenario
through 1992 includes an additional 839 MW of hot water
capacity beyond the 170 MW in the SCE supply plan.
EDF's schedule of new units takes into account the
chief determinant of the pace of hot water capacity
increments--the need to allow a three year interval
between completion of the first commercial scale units

11 /

and operation of additional plants.—

To provide for

the possibility of difficulties and delays at a particular
location, the EDF scenario limits additions in any year
to 150 MW, or one 50 MW unit at three out of the five
Imperial Valley locations

(Heber, Brawley, Salton Sea,

Westmorland, and East M e s a ) .
The EPRI study notes that achieving the "probable"
level of development projected by the state's utilities
in the EPRI survey depends on "successful demonstration
of technology for using liquid-dominated geothermal
resources," i .e ., hot water geothermal.— '

According

to SCE, the major question associated with feasibility
of hot water geothermal technology in California is
adaptability of flash plants to the highly saline brines
13/
encountered at some hot water fields.— '
Hot water geothermal technology is not new:

plants

have operated for years in Italy (400 M W ) , Hew Zealand
(190 MW), Mexico (150 MW), Turkey, the Philippines, El
Salvador, the U.S.S.R., Iceland, and Japan.— ^

Salinity

is not a constraint to the level of development in the
EDF scenario, since most of California's hot water
resource, including over 1000 MW at Imperial Valley sites,
is in fields less saline than Mexico's Cerro Prieto
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field, where the commercial hot water technology has
been proven successful.

For a more extensive discussion

of the consequences of salinity for hot water geothermal
development, see the Technical Appendix.
Costs and Technical Parameters
With the exception of capital cost and fuel cost
for SCE's hot water geothermal plants, which are derived
in the Technical Appendix, all assumptions regarding
costs and technical parameters for geothermal are in
agreement with estimates made by SCE and PGSsE.

Footnotes

1/ P G o E , CFll III, Form R-4, June 1980.
2/ SCE, "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 1980.
3/ Both the PG&E resource plan and the EDF scenario include
a 53 Mtf NCPA unit in 1981, a 53 MW NCPA unit in 1982,
a 55 MW SMUD unit in 1983, and a 55 MW SMUD unit in 1984.
4/ L.J.P. Muffler, e d . , Assessment of Geothermal Resources
of the United States -- 1978, U.S. Geological Survey
Circular 790, 1979, Tables 4 and 8.
5/ C.D. Fredrickson, "Analysis of Requirements for Accelerating
the Development of Geothermal Energy Resources in California,"
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1977.
6/ Interagency Geothermal Coordinating Council, "Third
Annual Report, Geothermal Energy Research Development
6i Demonstration Program," March, 1979.
77 Vasel Roberts and Paul Kruger, Electric Power Research
Institute, "Utility Industry Estimates of Geothermal
Electricity," Geothermal Resources Council Transactions,
Vol. 3, September, 1979.
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8/ L.J.P. Muffler, o p .cit.; California Energy Commission,
"Comparative Evaluation of Nontraditional Energy Resources,"
1980; Thomas A.V. Cassel e t a l . , "Geothermal Investment
Analysis With Evaluation of California and Utah Resource
Areas," Technecon Analytic Research, Inc. and the Univer
sity of Pennsylvania, Oct. 1979; personal communication
from L.J.P. Muffler, U.S.G.S., July 17, 1980; personal
communication from David Hill, California Energy Commission,
July 11, 1980.
For discussion, see the Technical Appendix.
97 Fredrickson, o p .cit.; Interagency Geothermal Coordinating
Council, o p .cit.; R. Trehan et a l ., Site Specific Analysis
of Geothermal Development--Scenarios and Requirements.
Volume I I , Mitre Corporation, April 1978.
10/ Cassel, o p .cit.; Fredrickson, o p .cit.; Interagency
Geothermal Coordination Counsel, o p .cit.; Trehan, o p .c i t .
11/ Personal communication with Edward Ennis, California
Energy Commission, Geothermal Division, June 20, 1980.
12/ Roberts and Kruger, o p .cit.
13/ SCE and PG&E, "Proponents Environmental Assessment,"
A l l e n - W a m e r Valley Energy System, 10.15.1.6.
See also
"Prepared Testimony of S.P. Barrett," (CPUC Appl. 59308/
Exh. 18 and Tr. 1183:17-19).
14/ "Tapping the Main Stream of Geothermal Energy," EPRI
Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, May 1980; and Ronald Di Pippo,
A Summary of the Technical Specifications of the Geo
thermal Power Plants on the World, Revision 1, July 1979,
cited in PG&E" "Montezuma Power Plant Assessment Interim
Report," May 2, 1980 (CPUC Appl. 59308/Exh. 64).
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2.

COGENERATION

Through 1992, PG&E-^ and SCE-^ project that 992 MW and
374 MW respectively of new cogeneration will be added to
their systems.

For PG&E, this new cogeneration is entirely

accounted for in the company's resource plan.

SCE includes

116 MW in its resource plan and 258 MW as a reduction in
sales^
For P G&E, the EDF scenario through 1992 includes a total
of 1719 MW of new cogeneration,
scenario.

727 MW beyond the utility

For SCE, the EDF scenario includes a total of

1630 MW of new cogeneration, 1256 MW beyond the cogeneration
included in the utility scenario.
Table 7 provides a year-by-year comparison of total
cogeneration for the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario.
Table 8 provides a breakdown of 1992 cogeneration
capacity under each scenario into two categories:

(1) commercial

and industrial cogeneration, and (2) cogeneration in thermal
enhanced heavy oil recovery operations.
Discussion
The primary issues in determining dependable levels of
near-term and mid-term cogeneration capacity are the total
economic potential in a given utility's service area, and
how much of the potential can be realized in light of
institutional constraints.

Perhaps the single most important

factor is the degree of utility and regulatory commitment
to cogeneration development.

Although cogeneration technology

is well established, providing as much as 10 percent of
the electric energy in countries such as West Germany,
utility practices in the United States have inhibited the
development of this country's enormous cogeneration potential.
At present, public policy in the U.S. is shifting toward
encouragement of cogeneration due to mounting recognition
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TABLE 7

Cogeneration Capacity in EDF and
Utility Scenarios
(MW)

PG&E

SCE

Utility
Scenario

EDF
Scenario

1979

179

179

20

20

1980

204

204

21

21

1981

221

221

55

55

1982

273

273

90

90

1983

335

431

133

168

1984

398

563

161

246

1985

821

911

199

324

1986

871

1107

259

502

1987

921

1239

277

860

1988

971

1371

303

1038

1989

1021

1502

321

1316

1990

1071

1634

342

1494

1991

1121

1766

369

1572

1992

1171

1898

394

1650

Utility
Scenario

EDF
Scenario

Sources:
PG&E -- CFM III, Form R-4A, June 1930.
SCE

—

"Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10,1980.
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TABLE 8

Cogeneration Capacity in 1992
Under Utility and EDF Scenarios
(MW)

Commercial and
Industrial Cogeneration

Oil Field
Cogeneration

PG&E
Utility Scenario
EDF Scenario

823

348

1550

348

SCE*
Utility Scenario

394

EDF Scenario

870

-

780

^Includes firm and nonfirm cogeneration

Sources:
PG&E —

CFM III, Form R-4A, June 1980.

SCE

"Summary of Loads and Resources, June 10, 1980.

--
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of the inherent efficiency of the technology.

The Public

Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 removed the most
significant constraint to cogeneration by requiring
purchase of cogenerated power by utilities at their avoided
cost.

Although progress in facilitating cogeneration through

public policy has been briefly stalled by contradictory fuel
oil reduction measures--chiefly the restrictions on use of
petroleum fuels in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978--this problem appears to be approaching resolution
at the federal level.

The basis for this conclusion is

detailed in the Technical Appendix.
In California, state policy strongly supports develop
ment of cogeneration to the full economic potential.

Noting

that cogeneration "is the most efficient means of utilizing
fuels to produce power," Governor Brown on June 3, 1980,
set 6000 MW of cogeneration by 1990 as a goal for California's
4/
utilities.—
And in a pair of unprecedented decisions, the
California Public Utilities Commission on December 19, 1979,
penalized PG&E $7.2 million in 1980 for that company's
failure to pursue cogeneration as a major resource despite
cogeneration's clear potential and repeated CPUC warnings.— ^
The CPUC set as reasonable goals for PG&E an additional 600 MW
of new cogeneration by the end of 1980, achievement of which
will cause the penalty to be lifted.— ^

The CPUC also found

reasonable an additional 400 MW by the end of 1981, and
1000 MW by the end of 1985, for a total of 2000 MW which
could reasonably be expected to be available to PG&E as
new plannable resources in the near term.

(As of June

1980, PG&E had no new cogeneration under contract.)
A number of estimates have been made of cogeneration
potential for various utility service areas and various
categories of process heat use.

Unfortunately, there is no

study that systematically considers statewide cogeneration
potentials in all categories.
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Assumptions and results

of the existing studies are presented in the Technical
Appendix.
The EDF scenario of dependable cogeneration capacity
which could be operating by 1992 consists of three categories—
heavy oil recovery operations, large sites (greater than
or equal to 7 M W ) , and small sites (less than 7 M W ) .

The

construction of the schedule for each category, and its
justification, is described below.
Oil Field Cogeneration
According to the California Energy Commission, electrical
capacity associated with generation production of steam for
thermal enhanced heavy oil recovery operations in California
could provide 2500 MW by 1991 and 9000 MW by the year 2000.
Several cogeneration options are possible.

Crude oil gasi

fication systems and distillate-fired gas turbine systems
would yield about 210 MW or 350 MW respectively, at each
of four to six sites:

Kern River, Midway Sunset, Belridge,

and McKittrick in Kern County; San Ardo in Monterey County;
8/
and Santa Maria in Santa Barbara County.—
A different system, consisting of small modular cogen
eration units, is under development by Optimum Energy Develop
ment (OED); the first such unit is planned to begin operation
9/
in August 1980.At a size of 1.3 MW each, these modular
gas turbines are sized to replace the typical oil field
steam boiler, and are unique in using crude oil as fuel.— ^
A contract has been signed between PG&E and OED for power
and PG&E includes 68 MW of these units in its most recent
supply plan.— ^

The potential for modular unit cogeneration

at existing oil field sites has been estimated to be in
the range of 2000-4000 MW.— ^
Since August 1979, when some price controls on heavy
oil were lifted, and especially since December 1979, when
additional decontrol was effected, a boom of major proportions
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13/
has been underway in Kern County and other locations .— '
Even before the magnitude of this boom was apparent,
additional cogeneration potential by 1982 in the southern
San Joaquin Valley oil fields was expected to be 2000 MW.— '^
In July 1980, the total potential at the Bakersfield
and Kern River sites was placed at 6000 MW.— ^
In its current resource plan, PG&E includes 348 MW
of oil field cogeneration:

68 MW in modular units, b e 

ginning operation in 1981-1983, and 280 MW in one oil gasification/gas turbine topping cycle system at Getty Oil's
Kern River field.— ^

SCE's resource plan includes no oil

field cogeneration.
The EDF scenario includes development of 1128 MW of
oil field cogeneration by 1992.
follows the company plan.

For PG&E, EDF's scenario

For SCE, EDF's scenario includes

a 280 MW unit in 1987 and an additional 500 MW in 1986-1990,
consisting either of a pair of 210-350 MW units or a large
number of small modular units.

Since most heavy oil re

covery operations are located in PG&E's service area,
involvement by SCE in oil field cogeneration would require
wheeling arrangements between the two utilities.
Commercial and Industrial Cogeneration
The EDF scenario through 1992, for PG&E and SCE com
bined, includes 1831 MW of new commercial and industrial
cogeneration at large sites; i .e . , those greater than or
equal to 7 MW, which are covered by the provisions of the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (FUA).

For

sites smaller than 7 MW, the EDF scenario includes 390 MW
for the two utilities through 1992:
205 MW for SCE.

185 MW for PG&E,

The EDF scenario is based on projections

prepared by the California Energy Commission, disaggregated
to service areas in proportion to commercial and industrial
electrical consumption.
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For sites larger than or equal to 7 MW, the EDF
scenario includes 1831 MW for the two utilities through
1992:

1186 MW for PG&E, 645 MW for SCE.

The scenario

is based on a statewide estimate of "financially acceptable"
industrial cogeneration prepared by Resource Planning
Associates

(RPA).—

The statewide estimate is adjusted

for the service areas of PG&E and SCE according to the
relative consumption of energy by the seven industries
18 /
examined by RPA.— ' A detailed discussion of EDF's esti
mation procedure for both small and large cogeneration
is provided in the Technical Appendix.
It should be noted that the EDF scenario covering
PG&E includes even less cogeneration than the modest goals
set for PG&E by the PUC, and far less for both utilities
than their proportional share of Governor Brown's announced
goal.

Footnotes
1/ PG&E, CFM III, Form R-4.
2J SCE,"Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 1980.
3/ The capacity equivalent of SCE's sales reducing (non
firm) cogeneration is derived from SCE's estimate of
its energy production
4/ Office of the Governor, State of California, Press
Release, June 3, 1980.
5/ CPUC, Decision 91107, Decision 91109.
The penalty will
apply in 1980 and again in 1981 if PG&E does not sign
contracts for 600 MW of cogeneration.
6/ Ibid.
7/ California Energy Commission, Looking Ahead, March 1979,
~ p. 171.
8/ Mark Henwood, "Feasibility and Economics of Cogeneration
in California's Thermal Enhanced Oil Recovery Operations,"
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Consultant Report to California Energy Commission,
December 1978, p. 118.
9/ Personal communication with James Noe, Alpha National
Corp., July 18, 1980.
10/ Ibid.
11/ Ibid.
12/ Estimates of potential for modular unit cogeneration at
existing oil field sites:
(a)

2000-3000 MW-- Personal Communication with
Richard Grix, California Energy Commission,
December 19, 1979;

(b)

3468 MW based on 1977 production in the
southern San Joaquin Valley oil fields-A1 Stoddart, Optimum Energy Development (CPUC
O H ' 26/Tr. 1030-1047) .

13/ "Decontrol Signals State Oil Boom," Sacramento Bee,
December 22, 1979, p. 1.
14/ A1 Stoddart, o p . c i t .
15/ Personal communication with James Noe, op. cit.
16/ PG&E, CFM III, Form R-4, op. cit.
17/ Resources Planning Associates, "The Potential for Co
generation in California by 1985," prepared for the
California Energy Commission, July 1978.
18/ U.S. Department of Commerce, "Annual Survey of Manu
factures," 1976.
For calculations see the Technical
Appendix.
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3.

WIND

In their current resource plans through 1992, SCE
and PG&E include 249 MW and 222.5 MW, respectively, of
wind generation.—

^

EDF's scenario includes a total

of 2665 MW for both utilities through 1992.

Table 9

provides a year-by-year comparison between the utilities'
scenario and the EDF scenario.
SCE plans to begin testing two Wind Turbine Generators
(WTGs) in 1980:

a 3 MW Schachle-Bendix machine and a

500 kW Alcoa vertical-axis machine.

SCE's resource plan

shows the first WTG (3 MW nameplate, 1 MW at peak) starting
commercial production in 1984, with additional units pro
viding commercial power beginning in 1986.
PGocE's resource plan includes one 2.5 MW WTG in 1982,
then a four-unit 10 MW cluster in 1985, and additional
capacity each year from 1988-1992.
The EDF scenario includes testing of three candidate
WTG models beginning in 1982.

In 1983 two clusters or

three clusters, totalling 20 WTGs, begin operation.

For

all WTGs added in 1982 and 1983, commercial production of
power begins one year after initial operation, to allow
time for testing.

In 1986, the selected WTG model is de

ployed in a small wind farm of 75 MW capacity.

From 1987-

1992, 200 MW of wind capacity are added each year.
Discussion
Several studies indicate that the available wind
resource at high performance sites is much larger than
would be developed under either the utilities' scenario
or EDF's scenario.

According to Klems of Lawrence Berkeley

Laboratory, the "currently practical size" of the California
wind resource is roughly equal to present statewide elec
tricity production (about 500 x 10 ^Btu).-^
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A recent

TABLE 9

Wind Capacity in the EDF
and Utility Scenarios
(MW)

PG&E
Utility
Scenario

SCE
EDF
Scenario

Utility
Scenario

EDF
Scenario

1980
1981

-

-

-

-

1982*

2.5

7.5

-

-

7.5

1983*

2.5

57.5

-

-

57.5

1984

2.5

57.5

3

57.5

1985

12.5

57.5

3

57.5

1986

12.5

132.5

9

132.5

1987

12.5

332.5

24

332.5

1988

22.5

532.5

54

532.5

1989

42.5

732.5

84

732.5

1990

82.5

932.5

129

932.5

1991

142.5

1132.5

189

1132.5

1992

222.5

1332.5

249

1332.5

* Capacity installed in 1982 and 1983 enters commercial
production after one year of testing (i.e., in 1983
and 1984 respectively).
Sources:
PG&E -- CFM III, Form R-4A, June 1980.
SCE

-- "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10,
1980.

-66-

study performed for SCE concludes: "The development of a
number of large scale wind arrays for electricity production
in the Palm Springs-Whitewater Region is a realistic
goal."-^

The study found that 2900 4-MW wind turbine

generators (WTGs) could be sited in this region including
650 4-MW WTGs in its most promising s u b r e g i o n . A c c o r d i n g
to PG&E's "Montezuma Study," prospecting data already
collected shows that two sites, one at Altamont Pass and
another in Solano County, could support 396 2.5-MW WTGs,
i .e ., 990 MW of wind capacity.— ^

Another study prepared

for PG&E— ^ concluded that a wind potential of 3975 MW
exists

at non-wilderness sites.

The important question, therefore, is not the size
of the available wind resource, but what level of wind
capacity could be developed in the current time frame for
supply planning.

Two sets of issues are relevant:

(1) technical issues (the reliability of individual WTGs;
performance of WTGs in clusters; and power system inter
action of WTG arrays) and (2) site-specific deployment
issues (e.g., competing land uses, noise, and television
interference).
According to a PG&E expert, the technical problems
8/
associated with wind are resolvable.-'
However, neither
SCE nor PG&E has adopted an optimal strategy for minimizing
the risks of early commercial utilization for wind, a
technology that is still undergoing development.

SCE and

PG&E each show plans to test only one megawatt-scale,
horizontal axis WTG model,—

despite the availability of

WTGs from several major engineering companies, including
Boeing, Hamilton Standard, and Bendix.

Testing more than

one model at once would reduce risk and cut lead times.
In addition, the utilities plan to wait until after testing
of the first WTG model before testing small clusters of
WTGs.

This will further delay the construction of signifi

cant arrays of WTGs.

-67-

The EDF scenario prescribes a means of deriving
conclusive answers to both machine reliability and cluster
performance issues at an earlier date.

It departs from the

testing schedule of the utilities in two major respects:
1.

At least three manufacturers' WTG models are
tested simultaneously, beginning in 1982;

2.

Cluster testing is initiated in 1983, overlapping
single machine testing.

Testing more than one manufacturer's WTG enables the
utility to conduct "fly-offs," ensuring that the model
chosen is the most dependable and cost-effective available,
and avoids the risk of delays in the schedule, which might
otherwise result from the failure of a particular machine.
Initiation of cluster testing in the year following operation
of the first models allows for three years of operating
experience with groups of machines prior to deployment
of the first wind farm.
The concept of multiple-design WTG testing has been
developed by the Swedish Energy Source Development Board,
and is discussed in the Technical Appendix.

Significantly,

PG&E itself appears on the verge of announcing a multipledesign, overlapping testing program.

According to a

spokesman for Hamilton Standard, PG&E has issued a request
for proposals to several WTG manufacturers.— ^

Under the

terms of the request, the manufacturer must be able to
supply three WTGs, the first for installation by January
31, 1982, and two more for initiation of cluster testing

11/

by mid-1983.—

In mid-August, 1980, PG&E will announce

which manufacturer(s) it has selected.— ^
Due to the possibility that delays will occur even
under a multiple-model testing program, the EDF scenario
is constructed in such a way that up to three years of
delay can occur without curtailment of the total operating
capacity included in the scenario in 1992.
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The Technical Appendix includes a more detailed
description of the utility and EDF scenarios and an
analysis of lead times, fabrication capacity, and other
factors governing the pace of WTG development.
Deployment
Areas with high wind regimes, which would support
several thousand MW, have already been surveyed, as
discussed above.

With regard to the question whether

these areas can actually be utilized for wind power
generation, a number of factors have been identified as
possible impediments:

television interference, hazards

to migrating birds, small aircraft navigational hazards,
esthetic degradation, land use conflicts, and noise.
Information from both SCE and PG&E indicates that none
of these potential problems poses a constraint to the level
of development set out in the EDF scenario.

For SCE,

this conclusion is supported by the findings of the Palm
Springs-Whitewater Region Study.

After reviewing all the
13 /
factors cited above, the study concludes that:—
--At this level of analysis there do not
appear to be significant environmental or
institutional issues which would impede
turbine installation in the area.

This conclusion is supported by PG&E's discussion in the
14/
AWV Energy System Proponents' Environmental Assessment,—
which states:
Concerns that have been expressed about bird
strikes, audible noise, and climatic and
habitat disruption appear to have largely
been resolved by the performance character
istics of the MOD-O and MOD-OA machines in
operation.
The MOD-O at Sandusky, Ohio,
operated during three nights of heavy migration
with no evidence of bird injury.
The sound
produced by these slowly rotating machines
is a gentle "swish" as each blade tip
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approaches the ground, but the noise at
Sandusky is reported to be inaudible
beyond a range of 66 feet.
The potential
for damage from a thrown blade through
stress fracturing is recognized and can
be minimized by creating larger ease
ments around each machine.
PG&E notes that a wind farm might conflict with some
land uses such as housing development but not with others
such as cattle raising or logging.

With respect to the

overall impacts of W T G s , the company concludes:

"Except

for aesthetic issues and construction impacts, their
environmental impact would be minimal."— ^
Costs and Technical Parameters
EDF's estimates regarding costs and technical para
meters for wind power are based entirely on figures pro
vided by SCE and PG&E, as detailed in the Technical
Appendix.

Footnotes
1J PG&E, "Common Forecasting Methodology--III," June 1980,
Form R-4A.
2/ SCE, "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 1980.
2/ J.H. Klems, "The California Wind Energy Resource,"
prepared by Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory for the
Department of Energy, September 1977, p p . 20, 33.
4/ Thomas Zambrano, et a l ., Wind Energy Assessment of the
Palm Springs-Whitewater Region, Final Report, prepared
by AeroVironment, Inc. for SCE, February 1980, p. 7-12.
5/ Ibid., Table 5-1, p. 5-12.
6/ PG&E, "Montezuma Power Plant Project Assessment Interim
Report," May 2, 1980, p. VII-32, (CPUC Appl. 59308/Exh. 64).
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7/ Study perforaed by Dr. Albert Miller and Richard Simon
of San Jose State University; results reported in PG&E,
"PG&E Electric Supply Planning Process and Current
Supply Plan," Vol. II, pp. A-24, A-26 (prepared for
CPUC 011-26).
8/ "As far as technological problems are concerned,...
with intensified efforts by the manufacturers that have
sufficient resources behind them to solve problems,
such as Boeing and others, I think the technological
problems can be solved."
(CPUC Appl. 59308/Tr 2142:26-30).
9/ SCE does plan to test a 500 kW vertical axis WTG in
addition to the 3 MW Schachle-Bendix model; however,
SCE as yet has announced no plans to test the two-tofive-MW horizontal-axis WTGs offered by major manu
facturers such as Boeing and Hamilton Standard.
10/ Personal communication with Tony Quattrochi, Senior
Marketing Engineer, Hamilton Standard, July 24, 1980.
11/ Ibid.
12/ Ibid.
13/ Zambrano, et a l . op.cit.
14/ SCE and PG&E, "Allen-Warner Valley Energy System Pro
ponents' Environmental Assessment," November 1979,
pp. 10-29.
15/ Ibid.
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4.

BIOMASS
PG&E and SCE do not plan to build any biomass generation

projects between 1980 and 1922, although PG&E does include in
its current resource plan 130 MW of biomass projects owned by
other entities. The EDF scenario through 1992 includes an add
itional 160 MW for PG&E and 180 MW for SCE.

Table 1 0 provides

a year-by-year breakdown of capacity under each scenario.
The 130 MW of biomass in PG&E's scenario consists of one
50 MW and one 40 MW forestry-agricultural waste (FAW) project
in 1981 and 1984 respectively, and one 40 MW municipal solid
waste (MSW) project in 1984.

The EDF scenario adopts

PG&E's biomass plans through 1984, then adds four 40 MW
forestry-agricultural waste projects in 1985-1988.
For SCE, the EDF scenario includes 140 MW of FAW projects
(one 60 MW project in 1984; one 40 MW project each year in
1985 and 1986), and one 40 MW municipal solid waste project in
1986.

Discussion
The California Energy Commission estimates the maximum
reasonable potential for MSW and FAW to be 350 MW and 500 MW
respectively by the year 2000, and states that 120 MW and
400 MW respectively could be installed by 1991. —^
For MSW, a 40 MW project is already planned for PG&E's
service area.

Since the counties in SCE's service area

account for 44% of statewide municipal solid wastes, at least
40 MW of MSW capacity should also by available to SCE. — '
Most forestry and agricultural wastes are produced in
Northern California; therefore, the bulk of FAW capacity
will be in PG&E's service area.

Under the EDF scenario the

amount of FAW capacity developed by PG&E and SCE is 250 MW
and 140 MW respectively.

Development of this level for SCE

may require that some of SCE's capacity be located within
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TABLE 10
Biomass Capacity in the EDF and
Utility Scenarios
(MW)

PG&E
Utility
Scenario
1980

-

SCE
EDF
Scenario
-

Utility
Scenario

EDF
Scenario

-

-

1981

50

50

-

-

1982

50

50

-

-

1983

50

50

-

-

1984

130

130

-

60

1985

130

170

-

100

1986

130

210

-

180

1987

130

250

-

180

1988

130

290

-

180

1989

130

290

-

180

1990

130

290

-

180

1991

130

290

-

180

1992

130

290

Sources:
PG&E - CFM III,Form R-4A, June 1980.
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180

PG&E's service area; this would require wheeling arrangements
between the two utilities.
With respect to environmental impacts, combustion of
forestry and agricultural wastes is considered preferable
to fossil fuel generation,

since sulfur emissions are absent

3/
and particulates can be controlled using wet-stack scrubbers.Nor would the EDF scenario for FAW entail any added risk of
soil depletion, since the level of capacity included is
based entirely on the use of forestry and agricultural residues

4/

which are presently burned or buried.—
Costs and Technical Parameters

For both HSW and FAW, EDF's cost and technical assumptions
have been adopted from the cost of power study prepared by PG&E
as part of its evaluation of the proposed Montezuma power plant.
Details are provided in the Technical Appendix.

Footnotes
1/ California Energy Commission, "Comparative Evaluation of
Nontraditional Energy Resources," Staff Report, February
1980, p. B 2 1 , B31.
2J Inventory of biomass fuel resources by county provided
in Stanford Research Institute, "Program Definition for
Fuels From Biomass," prepared for the California Energy
Commission, October 1976, Table 2, p. 12.
3/ Brian Barrette et al. , "Energy From Wood," California
EIR Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 9, May 2, 1977.
4/ Ibid.
See also Stanford
~ ppT 16-25.

Research Institute, op. cit.
-----

5/ G.T. Skidmore, PG&E, memorandum to E.E. Hall, PG&E,
"Cost of Power Analysis for Montezuma Task Force,"
March 27, 1980 (CPUC A p p l . 59308/Exh. 66).
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The encouraging finding of this report is that
if energy alternatives which are preferred under
California energy policy are developed in reasonable
and feasible amounts they can fully replace the AWV
Energy System and other coal projects proposed by SCE
and PG&E.

Significantly, development of these pre

ferred alternatives would have economic benefits
for SCE's and PG&E's ratepayers and shareholders.
These findings are of particular importance because
the AWV Energy System, as proposed, would have an
unusually severe impact on majestic national trust
lands and vital indigenous water resources.

Therefore,

the AWV Energy System faces considerable difficulties
in obtaining necessary permits and approvals, and thus
its reliability as a source of electricity in the pro
jected time frame is uncertain.
Simply stated, preferred energy alternatives
can fully match the AWV Energy System in terms of energy,
capacity, reliability, and timeliness, without the
adverse economic and environmental risks of that project.
The AWV Energy System is clearly an inferior choice.

NOTE: Technical Appendices, not reproduced here, are
available on request.
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